Bouquets & Brickbats - Sarath Amunugama, Ajit Kanagasundaram, Chandre Dharmawardena etc

The Maduru Oya Fiasco

 Rajan Hoole

The Rise and Fall of the Tamil Militancy and the International Legal Implications of the Government’s Counter-Insurgency – Part 2

In the last chapter, we touched on the drive initiated by leading officials in the Mahaveli Authority pre-emptively to settle Sinhalese in the Maduru Oya Basin in the Batticaloa District. This area was to be developed under the Mahaveli Project. The story of this takes much of Herman Gunaratne’s book For a Sovereign State (FSS). The author should be complimented for an unusually frank narrative where he has been true to his perceptions. But after five years – roughly the period covered by the book – it was clear that his perceptions were in crisis. This was true of a large number in his class. What is particularly interesting about his book is that without being aware of it he tells us much about how leading Sinhalese politicians thought and operated.

The scholar-detectives of the Mahaveli Ministry, T.H. Karunatilleke and Hemapriya, found an eager disciple in Herman Gunaratne who on Dissanayake’s invitation took up the job of Additional General Manager, CECB. Karunatilleke was Director of Planning. The scholar-detectives saw no end of Tamil conspiracies during July 1983 and its aftermath. A particular discovery of Karunatilleke’s was that cunning Tamil surveyors in the Survey Department had been altering Sinhalese place names in the North-East to Tamil ones. One example was the supposed alteration of Kokkila to Kokkilai by adding an ‘i’. Had any one of them cared to look up the 1824 Census or books on Ceylon by Prideham or Tennant written in the first half of the 19th century before there were Tamil surveyors, they would have found the same names and even more Tamil names. They were capable of locating a Tamil menace under every bush and every stone, and went on to become the leading lights of Sri Lanka’s administrative bureaucracy.

Gamini Dissanayake was a sophisticated player who had use for such zealots in his power game. The prestigious and lucrative Mahaveli Authority placed him almost at the top of succession stakes. Reviving the ancient glories of the Sinhalese with foreign loans and putting the Tamils in their place was the stuff of the game.

Dissanayake’s use of these zealots may be compared with going on a camping expedition with children. One gets more life and work out of the children by making them believe that the camp is surrounded by ferocious lions, and that they would all pull through the danger if they do their part diligently. It was not like Dissanayake to dampen their zeal by pouring cold water on their delusions. He rather encouraged them.

In early August 1983, an alarmed Gunaratne informed Minister Dissanayake about ongoing large-scale organised Tamil encroachment in the Maduru Oya (River) basin, as reported by Mahaveli staff. It was hardly the time for Tamils to venture out into an insecure area. If there was any truth in the suggestion, it was an easy police matter. When Gunaratne requested that the Army be sent in, Dissanayake replied that the Army was otherwise engaged ‘dealing with problems in the South and fighting terrorists in the North.’ Dissanayake obviously did not believe Gunaratne’s reports. He instead encouraged Gunaratne to settle some Sinhalese there unofficially.

The factual position as reported by M. Anthonymuttu, GA Batticaloa, is also given in the book. The old villages in the area were Kallichenai and Oothuchenai. Under a government scheme in 1958, 685 acres of Paddy, Highland and residential allotments were opened up. On an understanding reached by K.W. Devanayagam, the MP for the area, 10 persons of Indian origin were allotted land on the scheme. 48 families of Indian origin sent to Batticaloa after the 1977 riots were also allowed to settle in the area. There were also about 200 encroachments by the expanding population from the two named villages above on 600 acres of land. This was the general situation in the country, and according to Minister Dissanayake’s order of 1979, these long-standing encroachments would have been regularised had they not been in an area coming under the Mahaveli Scheme. According to what had been the practice in Sinhalese areas, they should have been the first to receive land under the scheme.

Gunaratne was approached by a monk from Dimbulagala who had tried to settle Sinhalese in the area in 1974 and was made to retreat after protests by Tamils. The two then spoke to N.G.P. Panditharatne, a cautious man, who was UNP chairman and director general of the Mahaveli Project. He listened to the alarming stories related by them of ongoing massive Tamil encroachment in Maduru Oya and of the Minister’s unofficial go-ahead to Gunaratne on settling Sinhalese. Panditharatne told the monk to deal with Gunaratne in future and not to come to him again. He kept himself behind the scenes and ensured that money and vehicles for the task were released by the Mahaveli Authority. The monk shortly afterwards placed an advertisement in the Sinhalese daily Dawasa calling for applicants for land in Maduru Oya.

The Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, in the latter half of August, sent her envoy Gopalasamy Parthasarathy to talk to the different parties and to examine possible means to a political solution. Parthasarathy naturally called on Dissanayake. The discussion was no doubt conducted on the friendliest of terms with the utmost courtesy displayed by both sides.

Hemapriya who was hanging about came in after Parthasarathy left and asked the Minister if Parthasarathy was ‘zeroing down on land.’ Dissanayake said gravely that it was so. Hemapriya told him anxiously that he held the keys to the problem and should not yield ‘one inch of our land.’ Dissanayake affirmed that he would yield nothing. He then dropped a strong hint meant for Gunaratne that he was disappointingly slow about settling people in Maduru Oya. Dissanayake could of course have told Hemapriya that India was committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka

and was constrained by international law, and so could be handled without fear by sensible dealing. But Dissanayake preferred to pretend to the children that the camp was being stalked by wild beasts. To the children, Parthasarathy’s mission was presented as one to carve out Tamil Eelam.

From 1st September 1983, a band rising to 40,000 Sinhalese poor trooped into Maduru Oya, led by the Dimbulagala monk. This resulted in pandemonium. There was protest by the Tamil leaders, adverse publicity in the Indian Press and crossfire in the local media between the Tamil Home Affairs Minister William Devanayagam, also MP for the area, and Gamini Dissanayake. Dissanayake had very likely wanted something more discreet and had not expected this sensational outcome. But he was clearly open to the possibilities the unexpected development offered his career.

Panditharatne played his game from behind the scenes by telephoning a top defence official, probably the Defence Secretary, and getting the names of naval officers dismissed recently. The dismissals pertain to the indiscipline and arson in Trincomalee by naval personnel, during and before Black July. These persons were contacted by Gunaratne with a view to settling them in Maduru Oya. They were to spearhead the formation of a citizen army by finding another three dozen or so ex-servicemen and training the other settlers in armed combat. It had all the hallmarks of a crusade.

In early October Gamini Dissanayake decided to cash in by playing the legendary ‘Sinhalese’ hero Duttu Gemunu (Gamini), and in the process steal a march on his rivals for the top job. He called a private meeting of leading Sinhalese businessmen. Dissanayake spoke to them about the prospect of Indian intervention. He then had an unnamed gentleman explain the threat of Tamil Eelam and their proposed means of thwarting it by establishing Sinhalese settlements in the Yan Oya (River) and Malwathu Oya basins (north-east and north- west respectively), thus breaking the contiguity of the Tamil-speaking region. Dissanayake added that he had recruited dismissed naval officers to organise the security of the Maduru Oya settlement and proposed that the settlements at Yan Oya and Malwathu Oya be done in the same manner.

One cautious businessman, Dasa Mudalali, asked if this plan had the President’s consent and reminded the others that if not it was doomed. Dissanayake replied that not only did the President know, but that he would also get a contribution from the President’s fund. Rs. 3.5 million was pledged between them. Dissanayake gave Nawaloka Mudalali the task of naming the fund and finding the astrologically correct time to inaugurate it. This was duly done on the morn of 16th October with Mrs. Dissanayake serving milk-rice and Nawaloka Mudalali presenting a cheque. The cheque was never cashed.

The next day Dissanayake panicked and disowned having anything to do with the Maduru Oya settlement. How Dissanayake misjudged Sri Lanka’s position then is quite remarkable. Apparently, Dissanayake, a close lieutenant of Jayewardene, had never discussed the matter with him explicitly. According to Gunaratne, during Dissanayake’s long silence, some of his rivals had persuaded Jayewardene that the Maduru Oya affair was a conspiracy against him. Jayewardene decided to crack down and appointed Paul Perera and a Colonel Benedict Silva of the Volunteer Force to have the settlers removed.

One sympathises with Gunaratne, because he seldom sees through the deviousness of big- time politicians. It cannot be that President Jayewardene was fooled about what was going on in Maduru Oya from 1st September to 16th October. It had been all over the Press and was the talk in the diplomatic circuit. In such matters Jayewardene would not have known in full detail what was going on and would not have wanted to know. With Minister Devanayagam, among others, complaining, he would have had to go through the motions of sorting it out.

Dissanayake must have given Jayewardene some hints of what was going on and received what he took to be implicit approval. There were no differences between Jayewardene and Dissanayake on the objectives – e.g. the Weli Oya Scheme that followed. The establishment is after all very familiar with such methods. In doing something controversial one encourages a subordinate to stick his neck out, keeps a safe distance and keeps one’s options open on whether to take credit or to disown the affair. In the latter event, a minion’s neck was sent to the chopper. That is what ultimately happened to Cyril Mathew, and to Gunaratne in the present instance.

Consequently, in the power game of snakes and ladders Gamini Dissanayake took a tumble down the belly of a snake. Lalith Athulathmudali sold himself as the man-of-the-hour and went up a ladder as Minister for National Security in March 1984. Gunaratne spent some days in a police cell to be interrogated by the rising star ASP Ronnie Gunasinghe, and then left the Mahaveli Authority. When Dissanayake went up a ladder again, it was as a favourite of India negotiating the Indo-Lanka Accord. Jayewardene let Athulathmudali and Dissanayake pursue their own courses and kept his options open. Such totally unprincipled pursuit of personal rivalries would prove the bane of peace in Sri Lanka for years to come. Going from anti-India to pro-India like Dissanayake was the most normal thing in this game. Often the people, and particularly the minions, were left angry and disoriented.

As regards the Maduru Oya fiasco, what very likely happened was that Jayewardene faced an unexpected crisis. The Government could have settled 500 Sinhalese in the area over a few months and possibly have got away with it. It has been happening much of the time around Trincomalee and it is tiresome for a minority community devoid of state power to follow these up and fight them out. But an envisaged armed camp of 40,000 settlers was too much. Sparks were flying and even the Government could not have made it viable. And what was a pittance of 3.5 million rupees raised from Sinhalese Mudalalis wary of planetary influences?

Even worse, the Indian Government would have felt snubbed when it was trying to negotiate a political settlement. The Sri Lankan Government too would have looked utterly ridiculous and irresponsible, first hammering the Tamils in the South and then setting up armed camps of Sinhalese in the North-East where the Tamils had some security. Donor countries too would have been put off. When the seriousness of it was brought home to Jayewardene, he had no other option. It was a gamble of Dissanayake’s that had simply gone too far.

In early October when Panditharatne sensed that an evacuation of Maduru Oya was in the offing, he sent Karunatilleke and Hemapriya to the North to identify new areas where the crusaders in Maduru Oya could be moved. The evacuation of Maduru Oya was taken care of by the forces of nature rather than by forces of the State. The monsoon rains came down and the plain was flooded – a prospect which the country’s leading managers of water resources had overlooked. Blinded by ideological objectives high on their mind, these scientists forgot their very fundamentals, which every native peasant was keenly aware of.

T.H. Karunatilleke duly identified the Kent and Dollar Farms area in the Mullaitivu District where refugees from the Hill Country region had been helped to start a new life after the 1977 violence. There were also long standing native Tamil villages. Given the situation in the country, Tamil militants too visited the area. Although Karunatilleke makes much of this, he was then able to visit the area as a government official along with the Sinhalese Additional GA, Vavuniya, without anticipating any security risk.

The main burden of Karunatilleke’s report was from the same feverish imagination that launched the Maduru Oya fiasco: That there   was continuing planned Tamil encroachment in the area that would prevent the Sinhalese colonisation scheme at Padaviya – another fait accompli in the 1950s – from expanding into the Northern Province. It was this mindset, backed by state power, which finally turned an essentially peaceful area into a killing field.

Karunatilleke’s report of 12th October 1983 concluded thus:

“I strongly request these illicit settlements and anti-national activities be probed into and suitable action taken. Their existence will not only prevent the expansion of the habitat of the people living in this area on a planned basis, but also would pose a threat to national security.”

It helped to set off the kind of brutalisation leading to the rise of the Liberation Tigers.

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Mahaweli - A Spectacular Achievement of JRJ Regime Piloted by Gamini Dissanayake

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Ronnie de Mel’s contribution undervalued, corruption later gnawed at its vitals

Excerpted from Volume Two of Sarath Amunugama’s Autobiography

One of the spectacular achievements of the Jayewardene regime was the completion of the accelerated Mahaweli Development scheme. The Ceylon National Congress and its successor the UNP under the Senanayakes paid special attention to the development of the Dry Zone which was the heartland of the Sinhala Buddhist civilization. Archaeological findings have shown that Anuradhapura from the fifth century BC onwards was a magnificent world centre of Theravada Buddhism.

In addition to the monasteries and dagobas, bigger than the pyramids, the Sinhala Buddhists were heirs to an advanced irrigation and water management system the like of which the world has rarely seen. It was part of a hydraulic civilization which was strong enough to spread its influence throughout Buddhist Asia of the time. However, with invasions from South India and the spread of malaria, Sinhalese kingdoms began to drift south westwards along the rivers and tributaries and by the 16th century finally sought refuge in the hilly fastness of Kandy.

The ancient irrigation systems were abandoned, and the jungle tide enveloped the Raja Rata or the land of Kings. D.S. Senanayake made -the restoration of the irrigation system of the Rajarata the linchpin of his agricultural policy. Step by step he restored the ancient tank and canal system and settled the population overflow from the wet zone in the newly reclaimed areas. These settlements were called colonization schemes. It was an unfortunate use of terminology which was used by the diaspora to allege racial bias.

DS also imbued two of his promising youthful ministers, Dudley and JR with the mystique of the ancient civilization of the Sinhalese. JRJ would, over a brandy after dinner, regale his friends about the trips he made with DS to the Rajarata. The old man, who was a trained planter from the Agricultural School in Kundasale, knew of the value of frequent inspections and easy familiarity with the farmers. JRJ had enjoyed his stint as the Minister of Agriculture in an early UNP cabinet and was credited with the introduction of the Wap Magula’ about which we will narrate later in this book.

The early work on the damming of the Mahaweli ganga was undertaken by CP de Silva during Dudley’s 1965-1970 regime. This was the largest river valley development which could be undertaken in the country because the length of the river necessitated the construction of several dams. With Mrs. B’s victory in 1970, Maithripala Senanayake who was made Minister of Irrigation also supported this venture since as a leader of the Rajarata his dream was to bring Mahaweli waters to his home base.

Thus, when JRJ and Gamini Dissanayake turned their attention to this project they were lucky to find that most of the preliminary work in planning this venture was already complete. One of Gamini’s strengths was that he could get on with a job without starting a ‘witch hunt’ against Government officials. With his ample charms and persuasive skills, he could win over any able civil servant without wasting his time on recriminations.

This was a great advantage since he could build up a team of engineers and officials who had worked on this project under different administrations. I knew personally that he shrewdly flattered Maitripala Senanayake by consulting him and giving him credit for promoting this scheme. Senior engineers like Alagaratnam, Ratna Cooke, Manamperi and Laduwahetty became his chief technical advisors. On the planning and administration side he relied on a senior Civil Servant Sivagnanam who had guided the project under Maithripala Senanayake. This was a strategically wise decision because Siva played a vital role till the completion of the project.

But it was JRJ who gave life to the project. After a thorough briefing by officials, with maps on the table, which the President listened to with rapt attention, he inquired about the timeline for the completion of the project. When told that it would take 30 years, he gave a directive to his stunned listeners that it should be completed in six years. In other words he wanted the Mahaweli headworks to be completed by the end of his term of office.

ew knew that he had spent two days before that, intensively studying all the reports on the Project. How was this telescoping possible? The Mahaweli project was to have five dams – Rantambe, Kotmale, Randenigala, Victoria and Moragahakanda and a gigantic network of canals which would both augment many existing tanks in the dry zone as well as bring new areas under cultivation. JRJ was quite capable of giving such peremptory orders which modern management experts call ‘thinking out of the box’.

Nobody there and certainly not the ambitious Gamini, would think of telling the President that it was impossible. In fact, when they examined the problem they found that it could be done. The success of the Mahaweli scheme was Gamini’s path to fame, and though it drew the envy of others like Premadasa, he became a Presidential hopeful with a solid reputation and a dedicated staff behind him.

The earlier 30-year perspective was based on a sequential building of Mahaweli Dams. The new six-year timeline demanded that at least four of the dams be built more or less simultaneously. This entailed a massive funding and organizational effort on a scale which the country had not witnessed before. With the President identifying it as a lead project, the full support of the Ministry of Finance was mobilized, and though Ronnie de Mel always complained that his contribution was not duly recognized, he played a very important role.

It was decided that the funding and contracting out of the construction of each dam and canal network be undertaken on a bilateral basis under the umbrella of the World Bank. Though there were many earlier misunderstandings, the Bank under its deputy head David Hopper came to recognize it as one of its major global projects.

It must be mentioned here that the reputation of the JRJ government in the west as a pathfinder in ‘rolling back communism’ gave it a favourable positioning when seeking bilateral funding. There was a large component of grant aid in the financing packages while the World Bank ensured that bridging finances were provided at concessionary rates.

Since the Mahaweli scheme made the country self-sufficient in food grains, the net savings in the national budget on rice imports made repayment feasible unlike in later long gestation projects like highways.

The funding of Kotmale [Sweden] Randenigala [FRG] Victoria [UK] was secured on concessionary terms. Contracts were given to major companies like Skanska and Balfour Beaty who built up a local construction industry by subcontracting to local enterprises which today are the front line construction companies in the island. Since these projects were awarded on a `turnkey’ basis they were completed on schedule.

After Mahaweli, Sri Lanka became self-sufficient in food grains. Unfortunately after Gamini’s dismissal from office, successive governments have given this portfolio to incompetent and corrupt rural politicians who have not been able to harness the full potential of this major development project. These ministers were more interested in the lucrative business of awarding tenders and allocating newly opened Mahaweli lands to their kith and kin and political supporters.

It is well known that most Ministers of Agriculture have educated their numerous children abroad with funds provided by suppliers of fertilizers. Today Mahaweli is nowhere near being the game changer of our economy that was envisaged by JRJ and Gamini. It has however closed the chapter on ‘rice politics’ which had been the bane of JRJ’s political career and the linchpin of SLFP’s politics.

From the Island Newspaper of 1.1.2023

https://island.lk/mahaweli-a-spectacular-achievement-of-jrj-regime-piloted-by-gamini-d/

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https://thuppahis.com/2022/07/28/the-mahaweli-project-the-mother-of-all-development-schemes-in-sri-lanka/

July 28, 2022 · 8:53 pm

 The Mahaweli Project: The Mother of All Development Schemes in Sri Lanka

 

Ajit Kanagasundaram

 

40 years have now elapsed since the launch of the accelerated Mahaweli project, so it is an opportune time to review what was done and the benefits and shortfalls of the project to the nation. This project was the culmination of a 50 yearlong process that started with the rehabilitate ancient irrigation works and settlement of the dry zone lands that was initiated by our first Prime Minister, DS Senanayake, when he was the Agriculture Minister in the State Council during the British Raj. After independence, this moved on to more ambitious projects building large multi-purpose schemes like Gal Oya and Uda Walawe culminating in the accelerated Mahaweli project.

I have written this article on the Mahaweli project from the published material available, the fragmented and haphazardly maintained records at the Mahaweli Authority (unlike the Gal Oya Board who kept meticulous records) and above all from the information and advice of my friend Professor Gerald Pieris. He was a serious postgraduate scholar at Cambridge doing a PhD under Professor Ben Farmer, and I was a playboy undergraduate when we first met over 50 years ago. I could not have written this without his help, but the opinions expressed and the conclusions are mine alone.

Let me give you a brief history of irrigation, colonization and land development. In the 1930s, DS Senanayake started the process of restoring old abandoned tanks and irrigation systems in the Dry Zone and settling Sinhala farmers from the Kandyan areas as colonists in the Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, and Kantalai areas. This was the central plank of DS’s policy and was done to alleviate the acute land hunger among the Kandyan peasantry, whose ancestors had their lands confiscated (under the infamous Waste Lands Ordinance) for coffee and tea plantations after the Kandyan revolt of 1848. His objective was to create a nation of “self-sufficient, prosperous peasantry”. These irrigation, rehabilitation and settlement projects, although piecemeal, were done at a very reasonable cost and can be considered a great success as is well documented in BH Farmer’s classic study – Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon

 When he became Prime Minster of an independent Ceylon in 1948, DS, became more ambitious and the result was the Gal Oya Project, whose history I have documented in an article in the Island newspaper last year. This project was a shining example of what can be achieved – all objectives were met, it was financed from our own resources and managed by Sri Lankans   and there was never any hint of scandal. It was a pity that at the end communal anti-Tamil riots marred the record but this did not diminish the achievement itself. This was followed by the Walawe project, Kantalai and other smaller projects. However dry zone development and colonization was in the Senanayake genes and Dudley Senanayake   revived the old dream of developing the resources of Sri Lanka’s largest river basin, the Mahaweli basin, during his period in office from 1965 to 1970.

Actually, this was an old dream. The ancients, who were master irrigation engineers, were aware of its potential of the Mahaweli but lacked the equipment to build dams and diversions on such a large scale in the hill country. There were some attempts to use the waters of the Mahaweli like the Minipe annicut that took waters 48 km to irrigate lands near Pollanaruwa (not to be confused with the even longer at 52 km Yoda Ela), and smaller works like Elahera and Nalanda Oya. The British under Governor Ward in the 1860s similarly constructed some small diversions but did nothing of any consequence. The SLFP government under Sirimavo from 1960 to 1965 also [built] the Maduru Oya Dam (ADB financed) and Polgolla dam, but this work was not part of any comprehensive plan.

Then under Dudley Senanayake’s government from 1965 to 1970 (an oasis of progress and sanity compared to what was to follow both under the SLFP and UNP), the project was revived and the UNDP and FAO were commissioned to do a comprehensive study. They produced a seminal report in 1969 which recommended a Master Plan spread out over 30 years, covering not only the Mahaweli basin, but the adjacent of Kala Oya and Maduru Oya (covering an estimated 40% of the country!) , including 4 major dams, power generation of 470 MW and the clearing and irrigation of 365,000 hectares of land (900,000 acres) using the 6 million acre feet of available water. Further the plan envisaged that only 25% pf the land would be used for subsistence paddy cultivation; [whereas] 55% would be used for cash crops and the balance for other uses like forestry – I will revert to this in my conclusion.  250,000 families were to be settled although no details of the modalities were presented

This report, which highly recommended the project on economic and social grounds, projected an annual return of 15% on a capital outlay of Rs 6000 million – a very decent return for a project with social as well as economic objectives. Here was a project that would inspire the whole country, occupy the nation’s energy for a generation and transform our agricultural and energy sectors and the UNP seized on it eagerly. The Mahaweli project was launched, just before the 1970 elections, at a grand gala event, with dancers representing the mighty Mahaweli, and thousands in attendance. No doubt the UNP and Dudley Senanayake thought that this would win them the next election and in any sensible nation it would have. Instead the people preferred the SLFP promises of socialism, free rice from the moon, all this tinged with Sinhala chauvinism – “Dudleygey badey masala vadey”–  was an effective election slogan, referring to his failed attempt to resolve the ethnic issue with devolution, and this won the day. The UNP under Dudley went down to a crushing defeat and the country was plunged into 7 years of hardship caused by misguided socialist policies, when they also degraded the single best economic asset left to us by the British, the tea plantations, through a misguided and badly executed nationalization policy. Nothing much on the Mahaweli was accomplished during these years. The only positive outcome of these 7 dreary, wasted years was that the population was finally disenchanted with the promise of an easy life under ‘socialism’, and this particular siren call will never be heeded again.

In 1977 the UNP under JR Jayewardena were returned with a two-third majority and a mandate to dismantle socialism and nepotism, and promised corruption free good governance and consequently earned the goodwill of the West. JR, who unlike the Senanayakes was not viscerally interested in agriculture and land settlement, nevertheless seized this opportunity and announced the Accelerated Mahaweli Project to be completed in 7 years instead of the 30 years as envisaged in the UNDP Master Plan. In addition, coasting on the Western goodwill generated by his election manifesto promising good governance and development (all these promises were in fact never kept), he negotiated grants and aid for the dams and power stations whose construction was to take place simultaneously not serially as originally envisaged.

The UK granted 140 million pounds and offered to build the Victoria Dam and power station, the largest dam in the project and the single largest foreign aid grant that the UK has ever given even to this day. Similarly, Germany and Sweden gave grants and soft loans and offered to handle Randenigala and Kotmale respectively. Never before had so much aid been offered on such generous terms to any developing nation –- all they expected in return was for Sri Lanka to become a model of democracy, development and harmony as an example to other developing countries – these expectations were later shattered by JR’s communal policies culminating in the ethnic pogrom of 1983. However, the bold decision to compress a 30-year project into 7 years was the right decision and posterity will judge this as JR’s major (probably only) positive contribution to the nation.

JR appointed Gamini Dissanayake, a charismatic and energetic young MP, as the Minister of Mahaweli Development in a newly formed ministry and NEDECO, a Dutch engineering firm, was tasked to prepare the detailed implementation plan. Gamini was an excellent choice as he was intelligent, hardworking and had the ability to attract talent. Besides the main dams and power stations that were being built by foreign aid donors, all the Mahaweli Authority had to do was concentrate on downstream development like land clearing, building of irrigation systems and settlement. This they did energetically and effectively (at least at the start). The project had the following components:

§  A reservoir in Kotmale in the upper reaches of the Mahaweli mainly for storage and hydro-power

§  A large storage and power dam in Victoria in the middle-reaches

§  The Randenigala reservoir with German aid

§  Two other smaller downstream reservoirs

§  Maduru Oya was already being built with Canadian help

All the above was with foreign aid – the Mahaweli Authority was responsible for land clearing, roads and settlement.

Settlement

The first area to be developed was System H at Maduru Oya and then System C . Each settler family was given 2.5 acres but unlike in the Gal Oya project there was no careful select of colonists and the agrarian pattern was very similar to that followed in earlier projects . In other words the colonists were subsistence farmers dependent on paddy farming . There was no coordinated investment or effort to develop cash crops like fruits and vegetable production or create the necessary infrastructure like seed stations in model farms, storage cool rooms etc, in what the original NEDECO plan envisage for 55% pf the area. There was no concerted effort to develop all the lands opened up –  the System B has still not been fully developed to this day.

The number of colonist families settled is given below:

1979 to 1988  80,110

1989 to 1998 666401

…………………    (from Prof Gerry Pieris: Challenges of the New Millennium)

The original target of 250,000 families will never be reached. Moreover there was insufficient follow-up for settled families. In Gal Oya there was a colonization officer for every 100 families and a record was kept of the farming practices and output of each family unit (this was used by us the socio-economic survey that preceded the Farmer report). There was no similar effort in the Mahaweli and the families were essentially left to their own resources and naturally replicated the subsistence farming patterns that was all they knew about.

Impact on Ethnic Relations

One underlying motive of the settlement pattern was to change the demographics of the Eastern Province, and it was clearly UNP policy laid down by JR and energetically implemented by Gamini. In Systems H and C 90% of the settlers were Sinhala and 10% Muslim – there were no Tamils although the land was in the Eastern Province, a majority Tamil province.

The Tamil parties led by the TULF vigorously protested this plan as they claimed that it was in the historic ‘homelands’ of the Tamils. In fact this claim had no justification in history – the Jaffna Kingdom, for the few centuries of its existence, ruled only the Jaffna peninsula and the northern fringes of the Wanni. The Eastern Province was part of the Kandyan Kingdom or at least paid tribute to it. The Tamils had settled only in a 10-mile malaria free coastal belt along the Eastern seaboard and there were Sinhala settlements scattered thought the interior. These were undoubtedly the remnants of an earlier much larger population cluster. The Mahaweli project, a national endeavor, should have settled people from all over the country, and the majority had to be Sinhala to reflect the demographic distribution of the country. No, the injustice towards the Tamils was that they were not even given 15% of the land, to reflect their proportion in the country.

But by this time the Eelam war had started and the Indian government got involved in its ill-advised and ill-fated intervention [in the year 1987]. The result was an agreement with the Sri Lanka government enshrined in a document called Annexure C. This stated, amongst provisions for devolution, which were never implemented, that the settlers in the Mahaweli System were to represent the ethnic composition of the Island – ie 75% Sinhala, 15% Tamil and 10% Muslim. This was when the Reverend Divulugala Seelankara Thera , a maverick and hitherto unknown monk, came in. Secretly encouraged and supported by Gamini and his senior officials, and using Mahaweli Authority funds and transportation, he brought in thousands of Sinhala settlers, selected willy-nilly, to settle the lands that were to be reserved by Tamils. But this time Gamini had gone too far, and under Indian government pressure (well documented by the Indian High Commissioner Dixit in his book) the army was used to evict some of these settlers. The LTTE later assassinated this monk. But the Tamils were never settled in System B (the largest area to be settled) as this land was by now contested in battle with the LTTE and development work was obviously not possible. Thus, unlike in Gal Oya where they were treated fairly, the Tamils did not benefit from the Mahaweli project and, in fact, many were even evicted from their ancestral lands in the name of development. This went even for those Tamils actually displaced by the Mahaweli project.

Power Generation

This was the most successful part of the Mahaweli project. The hydro resources exploited by the project are :

Bowatenne       40 MW

Kotmale            200 MW

Maduru Oya       40 MW

Plogolla Barage 40 MW

Randenigalla    135 MW

Rantambe           52 MW

Victoria             210 MW

The power generated alone justified the capital expenditure on the project and protected the Sri Lanka economy from blackout during the oil price surges in the early 1980s. For many years Sri Lanka obtained over 50% of its power from Mahaweli, but this has now fallen to about 35% due to changes in the rainfall pattern and silting  in the upper reservoirs due to poor land use practices in the Kandy urban environment, particular excavations for building sites.

Corruption

In the Accelerated Mahaweli project, JR opened the floodgates to corruption on an industrial scale and this is one area where Gamini will be judged negatively by history. This was in stark contrast to earlier projects like Gal Oya where there was not even a hint of scandal. When my father was Chairman of the Gal Oya Board from 1951 to 1957 and building a house in Colombo, he would not even order building supplies under his own name fearing unsolicited discounts from suppliers! The LSSP youth paper of the 1980s described many instances of corruption and favoritism in the Mahaweli projects. The joke that the Mahaweli had been diverted from Trinco to Finco had a lot of truth in it. Finco, a company owned by Gamini’s in-laws – the Weerasooriyas —  benefited from lucrative contracts, tenders and ‘consultancy’ projects.  So did the Maharajah organization – at least in this area the Tamils got their fair share! This is also documented by Gamini Irriyagolle, an erstwhile friend of Gamini, in his book The Truth About the Mahaweli. There were other examples. One Mudalali with UNP connections was given the monopoly contract to supply concrete cement for the project, without having to go through a tender process. At Rs 6000 trips per delivery in his fleet of 30 trucks he made a fortune, and furthermore he received a loan from Bank of Ceylon to buy the cement mixer trucks without having to supply collateral. He is a household name today and has diversified into other businesses like hospitals. The donors were aware of this, but helpless to change it and it was widely rumoured that Gamini was one of the richest politicians in Asia in the same league af Marcos and Suharto.

Conclusion – The Missed Opportunity

While it is true that the reservoirs and power stations were completed on schedule by the donors, a project of this magnitude required the focused and undivided attention of the government in downstream development. In the absence of this process, the potential of the areas opened (some of the most fertile in the Island) was never fully realized. It is easy to award mega-contracts (and collect the kick-backs) but it is much harder to ensure that it effectively used to its full potential. The land could and should have been used for high value added cultivation of vegetables and fruits in addition to paddy cultivation, but this required sophisticated methods and extension infrastructure for seed material and other inputs, for which there were no longer any funds or even interest by the government.

Mere paddy cultivation was no longer attractive even for rural families by the mid 1980s – an average farmer getting 4 metric tons per hectare in 2 annual crops could expect to realize Rs 50,000 per annum. Far less than he could earn in cities as a 3 wheeler driver or security guard or in the Middle East. The answer, even now, is to raise productivity to the levels currently attained by demonstration farms in Sri Lanka (8 MT per acre), if not to the levels in Japan and Taiwan where farmers get 6 times the output from a hectare of paddy land. Unlike in the Gal Oya era in the 1950s when there was a great demand for the  paddy lands to resettle Wet Zone farmers, by the 1990s  land hunger had  eased and there were other options for village youth especially in the Middle East and in the cities. To this day the lands, especially under System B remain underutilized.

A short anecdote will illustrate this. A friend of my son who is in his early 30s and an investment banker in Singapore, decided to return to Sri Lanka to try his hand at large scale farming in the Mahaweli area. As he was well connected politically (his uncle was a Muslim MP from down south) he had no problems in acquiring the land. He had a Lebanese partner who was willing to invest and market the produce, and the soil was analyzed and found to be ideal for grapes. 500 acres were planned. However, after 3 years he returned to Singapore disappointed and disillusioned. The roads were terrible, impassable during the rains, and above all there were no storage cool rooms to keep the produce prior to air shipment. These are basic amenities that should have been provided by the Mahaweli Authority and its absence condemned an enterprising young man to failure. If he, with his wealth, foreign contacts and access to capital could not succeed, what hope is there for the ordinary Mahaweli settler!

Today the Mahaweli Project has still not realised its full potential, partly due to the distraction of the Eelam war, but mainly due to the lack of interest on the part of both UNP and SLFP regimes. Entrepreneurs will find there is still good land available for agricultural projects, if they are not after a quick buck – agriculture requires patience and staying power. JR should be given his due for his bold initiative in compressing the project from 30 to 7 years. Gamini also deserves credit for the implantation of the four major dams.  However much remains to be done from an overall economic perspective as the Mahaweli project merely created 80,000 settler families living just above the poverty line (see Thayer Scudders book – Large Dams and their Impact). We could and should have aimed higher. Take paddy production – our current average is 4 MT per hectare when government run model farms achieve 8 MT per hectare (still lower than Japan, Korea and Taiwan – though admittedly they have more sunlight hours in the summer).

If we had kept up the rate of increase that was achieved by Dudley Senanayke’s government from 1965 to 1970 when yields per hectare increased by 34%, we would have achieved self-sufficiency even without the Mahawelil lands. Dudley had the ‘Govi Rajah’ scheme to identify and encourage the best farmers in each district and all MPS had to participate. Dudley was even photographed in an ‘amudey’ (loin cloth) ploughing a paddy field, much to the amusement of Colombo sophisticates in their drawing rooms. But this was exactly the right policy to encourage and reward good farming practices. But after his time, all our leaders had other priorities and a golden opportunity was missed.

The Mahaweli Project should have given us a surplus to export rice of the quality and variety demanded by foreign customers — Thailand for example exports 10 million metric tons per year giving a handsome return to their farmers. Also with fruits and vegetables – the original plan envisaged that 55% of the land would be used for this purpose but I doubt if we achieved even 10% of this. I am not talking about a cottage industry, but a major export earner if we had done this seriously. Thailand for example exports over $ 3 billion worth of fruits and vegetables per year (up from $ 250 million ten years ago), over $ 1 billion to China alone (Bank of Thailand statistics). India’s exports of Mangoes alone are $1 billion (equivalent to all our tea exports) largely consisting of a variety called Alphonso that, in my opinion is inferior to our best Jaffna mangoes, from which we could have developed a breed to be planted in the Mahaweli zone. Our record in dairy production is also feeble, and I notice that we now import oranges from California and Israel. We no longer get the ‘panni thodang’ from Moneragala and Bibile that were the sweetest oranges I have ever tasted. We could have cultivated this on a large scale and it had the unique advantage of being green in colour rather than orange, and this would have helped create a brand.

An Israeli expert on horticulture, Itzak Perry, got down by my father to advice on citrus cultivation in Gal Oya told him that not only was the entire Eastern Province suitable but that our so called ‘dry zone’ gets four  times the rainfall of the Negev desert that the Israeli’s have made bloom. What have we achieved with or God given rich soils and abundant water? Quoting from a Dutch Embassy report of 2015 – Vegetable exports $37m, imports $392, fruit exports, fruit exports $212 million and imports $68 million – a net deficit of $211 million. If we achieve even half of Thailand’s current exports of fruits and vegetables in 5 years, we would at one stroke solve both our employment and foreign exchange problems. This is where the future lies not in futile dreams of enormous FDI, building a Megapolis (Megalomaniapolis?) and becoming an international banking center.

Let us examine this last proposition for a moment and realize how unrealistic it is in a country where over 90% of government revenue goes on debt servicing. FDI for industry requires good infrastructure of industrial parks (we don’t have it), Ports (the only thing we do have), a pool of technically trained labour ( we have only 2 technical colleges and Singapore 6 and a nationwide apprentice programme), and cheap reliable electricity (a joke?). So there is nothing special about Sri Lanka and the only significant industry that we have created is garments which relies on cheap labour and foreign quotas.

As for becoming an international banking center, it assumes that the world needs another one in addition to New York, London, Dubai, Singapore and Tokyo (and perhaps Frankfurt after Brexit) – and we do not have the necessary pre-requisites . First an ecosystem of lawyers, insurance specialists, technologists and workers fluent in English, good office space at a reasonable cost (space at the World Trade Center costs Rs 600 to Rs 900 psf/month for a 20 year old building, while more modern office space in Changhi business park in Singapore rents for Sing $4.50 (equivalent to Rs 450 per sq ft/month), and world class telecommunication links – an example of our SLT is that we moved office to Rajagiriya 6 months ago and are still awaiting our land line to be moved (the excuse is there are no “loops”)!

The most important requirement however is a judicial system with a track record of incorruptibility and impartiality (another joke?). Without this office space in expensively reclaimed land will not find tenants – I can say this with 25 years of banking experience in Singapore, where I was instrumental in setting up a technology hub for Citibank in Singapore. Overall in technology alone there are now over 10,000 staff in high paying jobs.

I am tempted to paraphrase Bill Clinton’s famous aphorism when he won the 1992 Presidential election – “It is agriculture, Stupid”. We have been blessed with some of the best land and water resources and must learn to use it. To do this will not be easy and will require a multi-generational effort.  D S Senanayake’s ambition was to create a “self-reliant, prosperous peasantry;” – emphasize the word prosperous. If we do not follow this simple objective set for us by our founding father, our youth will continue to drift to dead end jobs in the cities as security guards or 3-wheeler drivers, and our girls to domestic servitude in the Middle East or the “satanic mills” of garment factories or work in the numerous hair salons that have sprung up, while moonlighting as “hostesses” to supplement their meagre income. The choices are stark but do we have an option?

Ajit Kanagasundram ……..  ajitkanagasundram@gmail.com. The writer is a former banker who is now an investor in renewable energy

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A NOTE from Professor CHANDRE DHARMAWARDANA in Canada, 27 July 2022:

“During the time of DS, he gave the job to competent people and did not interfere, or put in his own eccentric views (as Gota did with regard to fertilizers), and followed due process.      Note Matt Ridley’s comments on the fertilizer disaster:  ………………………………………. https://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/eco-extremism-in-sri-lanka/”

THUPPAHI ADDENDUM:  Some Previous Items on the Dry Zone Colonization & Development Schemes

KK De Silva: “The Gal Oya Scheme and the People who made it a Reality,” 20 May 2022, https://thuppahis.com/2022/05/20/the-galoya-valley-scheme-the-people-who-made-it-a-reality/

From KM. De Silva:  DS. The Life of DS Senanayake, (1884-1952): “DS Senanayake’s Endeavours in Peasant Agriculture,” 26 January 2022, https://thuppahis.com/2022/01/26/ds-senanayakes-endeavours-in-peasant-agriculture/

Chandre Dharmawardana: “Addressing a Criticism of DS Senanayake’s Dry Zone Colonization Schemes,” 28 May 2021, https://thuppahis.com/2021/05/31/addressing-a-criticism-of-ds-senananyakes-dry-zone-colonization-schemes/

Michael Roberts 2020 “Introducing PUL ELIYA by Edmund R. Leach,” 21 December 2020, ……………………………………………. https://thuppahis.com/2020/12/21/introducing-pul-eliya-by-edmund-r-leach/

Gerald H Peiris: “The current land reforms and peasant agriculture in Sri Lanka,” South Asia Journal of South Asian Studies, 1975 pp 78-89

Mick P Moore: The State and Peasant Politics in Sri Lanka, CUP, 1985 …. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/abs/state-and-peasant-politics-in-sri-lanka-by-mick-moore-cambridge-cambridge-university-press-1985-xv-328-pp-m

 

5 responses to “The Mahaweli Project: The Mother of All Development Schemes in Sri Lanka”

1. Chandre Dharma-wardana

July 29, 2022 at 12:53 am

Ajit K has given an excellent overview. Sri Lanka should use its biodiversity, its rainfall and its land optimally to create food for consumption and export, and also energy instead of going for fossil fuels. Trying to “industrialize” and create concrete jungles and asphalt highways that seem to inspire some planners who still hark back to Soviet style planning or neoliberal approaches should think again. Progress cannot be achieved by rejecting technology, as has been done by the Jayasumana-Ratana-NalindeSilva-Padeniya band wagon claiming that we have to go back to “traditional knowledge”, traditional (low-yielding) seeds, and not use agrochemicals, to be satisfied with two metric tonnes of paddy per hectare!.

2. Sachi Sri Kantha

July 29, 2022 at 7:48 am

I hesitate to pick on Prof. Chandre Dharmawardana’s expertise. My comment is related to his ‘Note’ that, “During the time of DS, he gave the job to competent people and did not interfere..”. If so, is there a reason, why he pined for his son Dudley to step into his shoes as the next PM, over the seniority and claims of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Sir John Kotelawala? That sort of nepotism in 1952, was the first erroneous step that spoiled the bright future of the newly independent nation.

3. K. K. De Silva

July 29, 2022 at 12:43 pm

A commendable effort to review the Mahaweli Scheme in its entirety, including its shortcomings. It is up to policy makers to take serious note of some of the observations made under “Missed Opportunity” in regard to what should have been done for the greater good of the farming community & the country under the scheme. Had the former President provided leadership to implement some of these suggestions, instead of the disastrous organic fertiliser policy, he probably would have won a second term.
An inadvertent error is noted in regard to the work done by the SLFP government from 1960-1965. The preliminary work on Maduru Oya dam was entrusted to the RVDB & the work commenced in 1978 under the direction of veteran Engineer M. S. M. De Silva. He was living at the site in a caravan & the workers, who had been briefed about the ancient Maduru Oya Sluice, came across it when the jungle was being cleared. At the time of the 1978 November cyclone, the Sluice was still under excavation. However, the dam was constructed with assistance from Canada (as stated in the essay) by a joint Venture of 4 Canadian firms (FAFJ) from April 1980 to June 1983. The Polgolla dam was completed during the SLFP government from 1970-1977.

 

4. Chandra Maliyadde

July 29, 2022 at 4:58 pm

Ajith K’s overview is excellent and discloses the true picture hidden behind Mahaveli. The Mahaveli Development Authority was created for a specific job and for a specific period. This was done when Sri Lanka had a Department of Irrigation equipped with aii the facilities, equipment and technically competent technical staff. Engineering work was completed within 7 years but the more difficult soft ware part has been completely neglected. Further by accelarating a 30 year project to 7 years the environment was completely destroyed.
With all due respect to DS as Ajith K says “DS Senanayake started the process of restoring old abandoned tanks and irrigation systems in the Dry Zone and settling Sinhala farmers from the Kandyan areas as colonists. This was purposely done to settle Sinhala farmers in Tamil and Muslim dominated areas. This was one mooted point for the rift between races.
Today there are many agencies for the Mahaveli including a Ministry but Mahaveli development is stalled. I also invite ‘readers to look at the ease of doing business index computed by World Bank to identify why FDI is not attractive in Sri Lanka.

5. Vijaya Fernando

November 12, 2024 at 9:37 pm

Amit Kanagasundaram has done extensive research and congratulations on a comprehensive account. People centric development by the people is still possible. Money centric development is not development at all as money itself is an artificial construct.

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The Mahaweli Development Project In Hindsight | Thuppahi's Blog

The Mahaweli Development Project In Hindsight

Chandre Dharmawardena … an original article …with highlighting imposed by The Editor. TPS

It is interesting to look at the agenda of the workshop held at GANNORUWA in August 1974 [see references below] and ask what questions (and topics) should have been raised at that time, in hindsight, in the context of a number of issues where the Mahaweli project went very badly wrong.

Although there are many issues to consider where the Mahaweli project made mistakes, I will here write on just one issue that led to the deaths of thousands of farmers, beginning from late 1990s,  initially mostly in the Mahaweli C project area (I think).

Mahaweli is all about water and settlement of people (not “colonisation”. That word should be reserved for action or process of settling among and establishing control over the indigenous people of an area, etc., see Oxford Dictionary). People were settled in new land opened up by the new availability of water for farming and for life. Many of those areas had never been farmed or settled in, even during historic times of the ancient kings when the civilisation of the land was in the Rajarata.

The topics discussed then do not look at the environmental impact of a massive irrigation project like the Mahaweli. However, the outlook in the 1960s and early 1970s was somewhat naive and  environmental impact issues were not taken seriously. Even questions like schooling and play areas for children, and the medical facilities for the settlers were left as subsidiary matters secondary to the big job of hydraulic engineering.

The question of the availability of good drinking water for settlers was never raised.

In going from the Mahaweli project to the accelerated Mahaweli project, the number of setters was increased, and many were settled in higher ground AWAY from the river or associated irrigation canals. They were given areas for paddy cultivation in the lower land, but their homesteads and vegetable gardens were higher up in elevation. As such, these settlers living on high ground dug wells close to their homes and consumed well water, while the paddy plots were irrigated using Mahaweli water.

If we consider a a village like  Ginnoruwa (in Girandurukotte), it has three adjacent villages, namely Badulaupura (B), Dolahekanuwa (D), and Sarabhoomiya (S). All three villages were settled in the 1980s and almost all are farmers came from Badulla District in the Uva province. There were many other such settlements during this period, in many dry zone areas irrigated by the Mahaweli project.

By the late 1990s, medical officers noted the rise of a new type of chronic kidney disease among these settlers. Unlike normal chronic kidney disease (CKD) which is accompanied by signs of diabetes and hypertension, this new CKD showed no such symptoms until very late into the disease.

Its origin (aetiology) was a puzzle and hence the disease was named CKDu, or chronic kidney disease of unknown aetiology. By about 2005-2010 CKDu had reached epidemic proportions, causing a major health concern and breaching the capacities of medical services of the region.

A number of “theories” regarding CKDu soon emerged among the public.
(i) It was conjectured that the farming techniques that used fertilizers and pesticides were causing the disease, and that Mahaweli brought along an additional surfeit of such agrochemical residues from the tea-plantation hills that provided the catchment area of the Mahaweli.

(ii) An occult dimension was added to this conjecture when an academic of the Kelaniya University (the late Dr. Nalin de Silva) and some of his students (notably, Channa Jayasumana) claimed that God Natha had revealed that the water and the soil of the Rajarata region were contaminated by Arsenic, brought in via the fertilizers and herbicides applied by the farmers. This was also taken up by Ven. Aturaliye Ratana, a political monk, and Dr Sanath Gunatilleke, a California Medic.  Channa Jaysumana, Sanath Gunatilleke and Ms. Senanayake (a clairvoyant) published a paper claiming that Arsenic and glyphosate acting with the hard water of the region were causing  CKDu.

(iii) A third theory proposed by the geologists and chemists of the Peradeniya University was that the disease-endemic areas were geologically rich in fluoride, and that the water consumed by  settlers who got sick contained elevated levels of fluoride.

The claim that agrochemicals were the cause resonated with a lot of urban intellectuals and politicians. Many urban intellectuals believed in “returning to nature” and “organic farming, while nationalists believed that returning to “traditional agriculture of the Sinhala Kings” was the way forward.  They were able to get the popular herbicide glyphosate banned, and later they got all fertilizers banned, during the time of President Gotabhaya. These militants did not appreciate that  several metric tonnes of organic fertilizer were needed to replace the few kilos of chemical fertilizer needed per hectare. Such huge amounts of organic fertilizer are not available anywhere. So, this led to the economic collapse of the agriculture sector and triggered an uprising that eventually led to Gotabhaya’s ouster.

Meanwhile, field studies of the water consumed by the farmers, and the incidence of CKDu have (in my opinion) clarified the origin of CKDu.

Most farmers who consume water from the irrigation system do NOT contract CKDu. Farmers in the Hill country who use agrochemicals extensive do not contract CKDu. Hence the cause of CKDu cannot be agrochemical residues. A WHO study [BMC Nephrology, 14, 180 (2013)], and several other independent studies found that the Mahaweli water is not significantly contaminated with agrochemicals.

Going back to the village of Ginnoruwa, the people who lived in Sarabhoomiya village, which was close to the irrigation water system, did NOT get CKDu. However, those who lived in Badulupura, on higher ground, and who used their dug wells for drinking water contracted CKDu. Chemical analysis has shown that these Badulupura wells are rich in fluoride and electrolyte ions like Magneisum and Calcium. [Balasooriya et al Exposure and Health. 12, 823 (2020).]

When such water was fed to laboratory mice, they too ended up with damaged kidneys, as established in a key research paper by Wasana et al [Nature Reports 2017] and in interpretive studies [Dharma-wardana, Environ. Geochem & Health. 40, 705 (2017)].

Today, it is accepted that CKDu can be prevented by supplying clean drinking water to the settlers.

So, if the Mahaweli planners had, in the 1970s, done simple chemical analysis of well water in the Mahaweli settlements, and tested the water to determine  if the water is suitable for drinking, a major medical catastrophe could have been avoided, and thousands of lives could have been spared.

Even the political history of Sri Lanka may have been different as there would have been no incentive to ban agrochemicals and create the peasant uprising that triggered the Aragalaya……………….

See: https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2023/01/05/the_us_must_learn_from_sri_lankas_green_policy_mistakes_873852.html

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Responses to “The Mahaweli Development Project In Hindsight”

1. johnrichardson34

   October 9, 2024 at 4:10 am

   Dear Michael, Many thanks for this outstanding article. What a privilege it is to have had you as a resource and an friend and to have your resourceful articles, spanning a wide range of topics (including even a review of my recent book). We are all in your debt. Respectfully and with best wishes. John R

   
2. Edward T. Upali

   October 13, 2024 at 1:00 pm

   Dr. Dharmawardene says thousands of lives could have been saved, if the planners of the Mahaweli Project had provided pipe borne water supply to the colonists. In hindsight, similar arguments could also be made with respect to the Second World War 2, such as, if some of the European countries were more decisive and united against Germany, millions of lives would have been saved.

   As an Engineer, who worked on some parts of the Mahaweli Project, I am aware that planning was done in the late 1970s to provide water supply to Girandurukotte and other new towns to be set up within the Mahaweli Basin, but I doubt whether these plans included supplying drinking water to the colonists.

   The policy in Sri Lanka in the 1970s, at the time of the Mahaweli Project, as well as at major projects constructed since the late 1940s, such as Gal Oya, Uda Walwe, Rajangana, Padaviya, etc was to allocate land for homesteaders on high ground near the irrigation canal, but there was no provision for pipe borne water supply for colonists, as at the time CKDu had not been identified as a debilitating disease.

   Engineering & planning practices for any project depends to a great extent on the need for the project, available historical data, design criteria, financial resources, time constraints and the cost to benefit ratio of the project. When the implementation of the Mahaweli Project was compressed from 30 years to 5 years by the then newly elected government of Sri Lanka, designers & financial planners, no doubt, had to take some short cuts, to compress the massive project to a very short time frame. But the provision of water supply to the colonists was not an urgent item on the drawing boards. For example, in the late 1970s, many urban areas in Sri Lanka were also in urgent need of “a proper” water supply, and as such the government spending for water supply projects was directed towards urban areas that required water supply years ago rather than towards areas that needed them in a few years in the future. Further in 1970s, long term environmental modelling was still a developing science.

   CKDu, as a disease in Sri Lanka was first “recognised” in about 1998 in Girandurukotte, about 20 years after the colonists were settled within the Mahaweli Project Area. However, what caused this kidney disease is still unknown even to personnel in Medical Research, hence it is called Kidney Disease of Unknown etiology (CKDu). In hindsight, it is easy to say that if the Designers of the Project had included pipe borne water supply to the colonists, it could have saved thousands of lives.

   My reading of the map of Sri Lanka included with Dr. Dharmawardene’s write up, shows some areas shaded in yellow as areas where CKDu is widely prevalent, and the black dots, I believe, are areas where CKDu cases have been identified. It is noteworthy, that some of these black dots and 3 of the yellow shaded areas are in provinces where the Mahaweli water had no influence, such as the Western, Sabaragamuwa, North-Western, Northern & Southern Provinces. So the incidence of CKDu at locations outside the Mahaweli Basin are obviously due to some other causes, not attributable to the Mahaweli water.

   At locations within the Mahaweli Basin, it is possible, that CKDu is a long term effect attributable to the consumption of Mahaweli Water. However, given that the diverted Mahaweli Waters are used in all areas of the Mahaweli Basin, and judging by the distribution of known incidences of CKDu within the Basin, it is more than likely that CKDu is caused by local factors rather than by the consumption of Mahaweli Water.

   I have also read that CKDu has been diagnosed at other locations such as India, Middle East, Central America, South America, Africa and also in some European countries.

   However, currently there is insufficient information to conclude without doubt that it is the Mahaweli water that is causing CKDu in the Mahaweli Basin, or whether Mahaweli Water has any degree of responsibility at all.

   
   

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A Critical view of the conception of the Mahaweli Development Scheme (MDS)

August 16, 2017

By Yasantha de Silva

            In 1931, after Mr. D.S. Senanayake became the minister of lands and agriculture in the state council, maintenance work on some ancient irrigation works commenced and since 1933, the establishment of colonization schemes started with the first being at Minneriya. The  maintenance of the anicuts and channels at Elahera and Angamedilla on  the Amban Ganga to feed Minneriya and Parakarama Samudra respectively and of the Minipe anicut and channel on the Mahaweli Ganga, used the Mahaweli waters for dryzone agriculture again, as in ancient times. After the death of Mr. D.S. Senanayake in 1952, Mr. Duddly Senanayake became the prime minister and under his premiership, the Irrigation Department started the collection of data, the preliminary surveys and investigations, in the early 1950s, for the use of the Mahaweli Ganga for irrigation and hydro power, which is therefore the starting point of the 'modern' Mahaweli Development Scheme.

            From 1958 to 1961, which is during the first Sri Lanka Freedom party Government, the United States Operation Mission (USOM), which several years later was renamed ' USAID', carried out studies for the use of the Mahaweli resources for irrigation and hydro power, even when the Ceylon Irrigation Department was far ahead on the same assignment!

            In 1959, the preliminary report on the development of the Mahaweli Ganga was published by the Irrigation Department. In 1961, the USOM also made its report, with proposals for the development of the Mahaweli Ganga resources. Without any doubt, they would have extracted information from the Report of the Irrigation Department for their own report!

            The following (I to VI ) are extracts from the ' Introduction' in page 2 of the 1968 General project report on the Mahaweli, prepared by the Food and Agriculture organization of the United Nations Organization (FAO). My comments appear within brackets.

    I.          The Canadian Hunting and Survey Corporation (CHSC) also conducted investigations on the Mahaweli Resource Possibilities in 1961-62. (What madness by the government!  Getting another set of foreigners to poke their fingers into the Mahaweli when Ceylon had an Irrigation Department, a Department of Surveys and an Electricity Department which could have handled these assignments!)

   II.        ' In 1963, the Government of Ceylon requested the Special Fund of the United Nations (UNDP/SF) to explore the possibilities for the complete utilization of water resources of the Mahaweli Ganga for the purpose of irrigation and hydro power. (The Ceylon government is still tied to the Apron strings of colonial nannies!)

 III.       ' The UNDP/ SF appointed the FAO to perform this survey and the UNDP/SF, FAO and the Government of Ceylon signed an agreement. The survey was planned in two stages. The first stage, to prepare a comprehensive study of the river basins included in the project area and a master plan. The second stage, to provide the feasibility study for the selected first phase of the project development.'

 IV.       The duration of the survey was accepted as 4 years, 2 years for each stage. A team of FAO experts in collaboration with the Government  of Ceylon completed both stages between 1965 and 1968.''  This survey by the FAO was preceded by several preliminary studies of separate parts of the project area of these, the most significant were the studies by the USOM, performed in 1958-61 and the investigation done by the CHSC in 1961-62 (The 1959 Report by the Ceylon Irrigation Department has been completely ignored in the Mahaweli project report compiled by the project manager, P.G. Fialkovsky, as there is no mention of it in the Introduction. The Irrigation department report gives basic data which is of use to ascertain the water yield that can be expected from the Mahaweli, from records maintained by the Department for several years. It appears that the duties of the Heads of the Departments of Irrigation and Survey was only to handover files, reports and maps to the FAO Committee of foreigners. Further, the Head of the ' Ceylon' Committee, (as the committee of Sri Lankans is named in the General Report. was another foreigner, A Gromov, the U.N. representative in Ceylon, although Hon. Mr. C.P.De Silva, being a senior and powerful minister in the Government, Minister of Lands Irrigation and Power, and also a member of the ' Ceylon Committee,' could easily have led the ' Ceylon Committee' in keeping upto his position, authority and dignity. This shows that foreigners wanted to have absolute control on the planning of the whole Mahaweli Project to which the Ceylon Committee and the Government gave in meekly.

  V.        ' The appreciable role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in setting up the investigations under the Mahaweli Ganga Survey must be emphasized. I.B.R.D. missions visited the project twice before the field work was started by FAO. In May 1961, the mission pointed out the significance of the Project, stating that it is a promising multipurpose scheme to meet Ceylon's economic needs.' In June 1962, the second I.B.R.D. Mission determined the possibility of developing the project by stages and suggested the review of available data and further investigations to probe the problem more deeply.

   (This final paragraph of the ' Introduction' of the General Project Report, leads one to conclude that the MDS was a dictate of the I.B.R.D, as the I.B.R.D. had decided what to do and the Government of Ceylon of the period had only meekly followed its dictates as for example. (1) allowing the CHSC to do further investigations, (2) The Ceylon Government requesting the UNDP / SF to explore the possibility for the full utilization of the Mahaweli Ganga for the purpose of irrigation and hydropower, (3) The subsequent train of events such as the Government signing agreements with the UNDP/ SF and the FAO etc. )

The sub - servience shown by the ' Ceylon (Sri Lanka) government to the IBRD on the MDS planning is a terrible disgrace to Sri Lanka, since Sri Lanka has from the time of King Dutugemunu (161 to 137 BC) fought against all foreign powers to maintain its liberty and was self-reliant to develop its own agricultural economy as shown by the ancient irrigation works of Sri Lanka, which has no parallel anywhere in the world. 

Yasantha De Silva B.Sc. (Agriculture)

Article in the Lanka Guardian of 15 February 1979