An Evaluation & Analysis of the Scheme - Hans-Peter Müller and Siripala T. Hettige ; Others

 




mahaweli - the blurring of a vision

THE MAHAWELI - The Blurring of a Vision

by Hans-Peter Müller and Siripala T. Hettige (eds.)

Ratmalana (Sri Lanka): Sarvodaya
(draft)

 

PREFACE

Mahaweli is the longest river in Sri Lanka, running in a curve around the central Kandy-mountains down to the north-eastern shore of the island (see map 1). After many years of study involving many agencies, a Master Plan was formulated in 1968, presenting a long-term programme with the objective of harnessing the economic potential of the river. The purpose of the project was to produce hydro-power and divert a large proportion of the water into the northern dry zone for irrigation, in addition to new schemes on the right bank and augmenting the existing irrigation facilities to the settlements on both sides of the river. Linked to the so-called "down-stream development" is a large resettlement pr0grgramme intended to bring a pioneer population in the so-far thinly populated areas thereby reducing the population pressure in the wet zones

This project is one of the largest of its kind in the world, at the same time it is situated in a relatively small country, and it had been realized in the shortest possible time with a massive mobilization of external funds and expertise. The expectations were accordingly high, and the impact on the state budget heavy. After completion of the construction work, and the reorientation of state priorities towards other "frontiers", it is possible to engage in a general evaluation and analysis. With thin intention in mind, an interdisciplinary group was invited to a one-week seminar on the Monte Verità in Ascona, Switzerland to discuss issues considered relevant and to suggest further actions. The composition of the group should merge insider knowledge, expertise, multidisciplinary - and most of all, objectivity and a high degree of empathy. The core group consisted of 8 specialists from Sri Lanka, 2 Sri Lankans living in Europe, and 7 members from Europe and USA, including one living in Sri Lanka. Out of these 17 persons, 3 were female. A few additional invitees represented development assistance agencies, the private sector and the universities. Nobody from the present Mahaweli Development Board was invited. However, a participant has been mandated to inform the directorate, immediately after the meeting, of the outcome of the deliberations.

The meeting was made possible by a generous grant offered by the Fondazione Stefano Franscini, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zürich (Switzerland).

 

INTRODUCTION

(p. 1-22)

1) MAHAWELI AS A FIELD OF TENSION

Irrigation Settlements in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka: Historical Background

The Dry Zone of Sri Lanka, where the country's early human settlements and civilization were based, was the seat of a multitude of simple as well as highly sophisticated, elaborate irrigation works. Once the Dry Zone civilization collapsed due to diverse circumstances (Indrapala, 1971, Murphy, 1957) around the 12th century a.d. and population centres shifted to areas which are today known as the Wet Zone, only a few inhabitants seem to have existed in the abandoned region supported by small village tanks until recent times. It is only in the late 19th century that deliberate attempts were made to restore some of the irrigation infrastructure with a view to supporting village settlements. Even though the British colonial administration took steps to open up the area by extending roads and other basic services to the north-central Dry Zone around the turn of the century, concerted efforts at the restoration of major irrigation tanks and the reclaiming of long abandoned tracks of rice fields with the objective of returning to the `roots` and establishing dense peasant settlements were not undertaken until a considerable measure of self-rule was conceded by the British colonial power to the indigenous political elite in the early 1930's. The historical period that commenced with the establishment of large peasant settlements under the newly restored large irrigation tanks up till recent years is, in fact a history of continuous efforts to resettle people in various parts of the Dry Zone extending from Anuradhapura in the North Central Province to Hambantota in the South.

The most recent Mahaweli Development Project, on the one hand represents a continuation of the above trend, and on the other, marks a historically significant departure at least in one respect. Unlike earlier schemes, it permanantly links together a large part of the country through its extensive network of upstream reservoirs and downstream conveyence and distributary canals. This modern irrigation system cuts accross boundaries of a number of regions in both the dry zone as well as the wet zone hill country where the major reservoirs are constructed. This is unprecedented in the history of Sri Lanka in the sense that Mahaweli System for the first time technically integrates a number of otherwise desparate ecological regions.

The Mahaweli Development Project has constituted a field of tension since its inception in the mid 1960's, particularly after the decision for acceleration was taken in 1977. This decision has been the result of the confluence of several dominant interests, both internal and external. The dominant interests involved were such that they laregely determined the phasing of the process of implementation of the project itself. The history of the Mahaweli Project is a story of alignement and realignement of forces continually guiding the course of Mahaweli.

As is well known, Mahaweli became the lead investment project of the UNP-Government newly elected in 1977. The liberal economic policies of the new regime no doubt encouraged the donor agencies which came forward to contribute investment capital towards the project. The sheer magnitude of the project in the context of a much reduced implementation period no doubt helped bring the hardware component of the project into the fore-ground thereby pushing aspects of human settlement planning into the background, at least in the initial stages. The result was that the down-stream human settlement development was not accorded the same level of importance as engineering works in terms of priority, expert involvement, resource allocation etc. The time lag and the unequal emphasis placed between the construction of headworks, on the one hand, and the provision of support services for settler development, on the other, has prevented the simultaneous achievement of all major objectives. For instance, power generation targets have long been met, while social development goals in the settlements in terms of increased standards of living, diversification of income sources, housing, etc. are still far from being attained.

 

Dependence and Vulnerability of Downstream Populations

The construction of a number of upstream reservoirs and the opening up of a large downstream area for resettlement enabling the effective harnessing of the water resources of the Mahaweli river basin for electricity generation and irrigated agriculture has encapsulated a vast population, both upstream and downstream, within a complex ecological and technical system. The large population scattered in the downstream areas depends on the above system for their water requirements. While the peasant settlers in the upstream catchment areas of Mahaweli do not derive direct benefits from the Mahaweli system, the utilization by them of land and other natural resources in the region has a bearing on the sustainability of the Mahaweli system. For instance, deforestation and soil erosion resulting from increased exploitation of natural resources in these areas can have an adverse effect on the sustainability and the capacity of the technical system of Mahaweli.

Such a development can hardly be in the interest of the downstream settlers and of the country as a whole. Given the current tendency in the country towards devolution of political power and decentralization of administration, a question arises as to whether there exist system-level mediation mechanisms that are capable of bringing about a reasonable balance between conflicting regional interests.

 

System Logic versus Household Strategies

The nature of the technical structure and the size and the spacial distribution of the settler population dependent on it tend to pull the Mahaweli system in two divergent directions. The technical structure necessitates the preservation of the unity of the system in functional and ecological terms. It compells the authorities to formulate rational procedures for water allocaton and distribution on the system level.

The multitude of water users scattered in the downstream settlements who are mostly small-holding peasants are more likely to be concerned with the availability of water to their fields rather than with the wider concerns of the Mahaweli system. The intens competetion for irrigation water, pervasive normlessness, refusal to share cost of maintenance, etc. all point to the disruptive effects of such individualistic persuits of personal as against collective interests.

 

Bureaucratic Control and Settler Participation

Another dimension of tension within the Mahaweli system emanates from the continued bureaucratic control of the technical infrastructure. The high degree of vertical integration of the components within the system leaves limited room for local autonomy and control; and this has acted as an obstacle to the realization of the farmer's potential for self management. Experience with the organized local communities clearly indicates strong interest to achieve as much autonomy and control over lower structures as possible and to extent their area of influence upwards along the conveyance canal. This is evident in the fact that, in recent years organized farmer groups in certain areas like Anuradhapura have taken measures voluntarily to federate local farmer organizations. If such loosely federated farmer groups get co-opted by local politicians into their political constituencies, they are likely to have some influence over the actions of the higher authorities on the system-level, but no longer as independent farmer organizations.

The contradiction between centralized technocratic authority and local control might be reinforced by the recent attempts to promote democratic farmer participation through a programme of farmer organizations. One of the major obstacles to the growth of local organizations has been the tendency on the part of the local level officials to control or dominate such organizations. Given the nature of the Mahaweli organizational structure, these officials are mainly accountable to their superiors. So, as agents of a centralized authority, they aspire to have control over local affairs, not least in order to justify their own existence as a class of officials.

 

Top-down versus Bottom-up Approach

The top-down approach adopted by the Mahaweli authorities in the implementation of the project from its inception has inhibited bottom-up or grass-roots level initiatives. Though such an approach might have facilitated the efficient and effective implementation of the engineering programme, the same approach which has pervaded the process of implementation of the resettlement programme has no doubt been counterproductive in the latter context. The resettlement of a large mass of people over a vast area of land can hardly be compared neither with the construction of headworks nor the development of downstream irrigation infrastructure. The inadequate attention paid by the planners to this fact represents yet another instance where the technocratic bias led to many problems of resettlement, most of which are not new in the Sri Lankan context in view of its long experience with peasant colonization. A bottom-up approach to resettlement which would have taken into account the local conditions, initial problems the settlers face, the need to evovle social support systems, etc. could have avoided many of the problems that beset many settlers today. The high degree of social disorganization that already characterizes many settler communities could also have been checked if adequate attention was paid to the need for community mobilization at the outset of the settlement process. The presently evident self-seeking tendendy among many settlers does not necessarily indicate that they are incapable of engaging in collective endavours which benefit the entire local community. It should however be noted that the practice of bringing together housholds with diverse origins and backgrounds can have an adverse effect on the the self-help capacities of settler communities.

 

Equitable Distribution versus Class Differentiation

An ideology of peasant proprietorship has pervaded the process of rural peasant settlement in Sri Lanka since the late 1930's . In this respect, Mahaweli settlement programme has not been an exception. The persistent preoccupation on the part of the politicians and planners with such an ideology has curiously been against the country's experience which pointed to a general tendency towards class differentiation. In spite of restraining legislation, illegal disposal, informal control and aquisition of land, dispossession, etc. have characterized the land tenure patterns in peasant settlements. As in the past, this development has been judged as negative, unfair and unjust in the present-day Mahaweli as well.

So, the objective of equitable development as against the empirical reality of class differentiation resulting in the pauperization of a sizable segment of the settler population continues to provide a point of contention in the context of Mahaweli in the years to come. Empirical studies on class differntiation do not bring out conclusive evidence to show how and why differentiation occurs. The evidence is often so mixed and complex that the question as to whether the apparent inevitability of class differentiation should be taken for granted or whether steps should be taken to stem it continues to grapple the minds of all those concerned. These issues in turn have a bearing on another duality that characterizes the discourse on the settlement development process, namely, the issue of macro-economic integration and peasant subsistence production.

 

Growth versus Welfare

Irrigation infrastructure development which constitutes a major part of the Mahaweli development project is in fact the largest and most probably the last such investment in irrigated agriculture in the country. Given the magnitude of the investment involved, can Mahaweli afford to simply reproduce the small, subsistence-level, family-based production units across the vast span of land which has come under its perview? Or should not this investment result in regional growth and development which prepares the groundwork for agricultural diversification and industrialization, both rural and urban? But then the question arises as to whether it is too late to hope for such an internal dynamic in view of the advanced state of the second generation problem and the already unfavourable man-land ratio resulting from it.

There have also been other factors contributing to poverty such as persistent episodes of illness, indebtedness, inadequate access to water, etc. Empirical studies conducted by researchers in different Mahaweli settlements point to the impoverishment of a sizable segment of the settlers. While in some cases, impoverishment has been due to total dispossession of land, in others, it has been the result of land fragmentation. While the dispossessed usually rely on wage labour for their sustenance, those who retain at least a small part of their allottments tend to seek food security by cultivating paddy, mostly for their own consumption. Poor peasants who often do not produce a considerable marketable surplus possess no investment capital needed to cultivate other cash crops which are usually more profitable than paddy. This allows those with investment capital to lease in plots of land belonging to poor farmers to grow more profitable cash crops.

Many new settlers who move into an inhospitable environment characterized by disease, inadequate basic social infrastructure, the absence of extra-familial support in the form of reciprocal kinship networks, etc. often find themselves trapped in poverty. It is they who continue to eke out a living either as subsistence producers or as wage labourers. In other words, it seems reasonable to assume that the provision of adequate initial support in the form of healthcare, shelter, credit, extension, and income support is a precondition for successful resettlement, at least in the case of more vulnerable groups. The provision of a land allottment and irrigation water alone can be grossly inadequate if they are not accompanied by such services.

From a purely economic point of view, social infrastructure facilities mentioned above may appear to be unproductive welfare expenditure which may not bring any tangible returns. Yet, in the absence of them, if the settlement process results in the pauperization of a large segment of the settler population and breeds subsistence orientation among poor farmers, it is questionable whether initial investments in human resource development, in fact are unproductive investments. In other words, it may well be argued that such investments do in fact provide the initial impetus for surplus accumulation and consequent economic growth.

If the argument advanced above is empirically plausible, then, inadequate investments in social infrastructure development in the downstream areas may well explain the insignificant agricultural diversification and the absence of rapid economic growth in the new settlements. While dispossession and poverty prevent a sizable proportion of the settlers from engaging in economically viable agricultural production, the emergence of other social problems such as alcoholism, intra-family conflicts and illhealth makes the breaking away from poverty still more difficult.

2) IRRIGATION AND SOCIETY - A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

"Mahaweli" is a project which can be approached from many angles, e.g. ecological, engineering, economic, political, etc. The perspective guiding the papers in this publication is broadly sociological. Since the engineering work has been quite successfully completed, the most relevant factor for resettlement, management and maintenance has shifted to the efficient handling of social relations and political constraints. Politics in this view is defined as the arena in which competing interests (economic or otherwise) are articulated by diverse groups. In this context, the economic outcome can be treated as a product of political and social forces which are active on household and institutional levels.

Probably the most relevant area for analysis is the interface between government officials and settlers, mostly farmers. As far as agricultural production and the process of social integration of the heterogenous settler population are concerned, the future development of this relation may become the most relevant single factor influencing the success or the failure of the project. In Sri Lanka's large irrigation systems, control over land is primarily based on legal regulations and not on direct ownership, neither of farmers nor of officials. Whereas farmers work on land leased out by the state, officials dominate core functions of the production process mainly by exerting control over the management and distribution of irrigation water. In this respect, two questions arise: The first refers to the extent that state institutions are directly involved in managing resources of agricultural production (e.g. devolution), the second relates to the efficacy of such state activities (e.g. legitimacy).

The sociological approach adopted in the present work seems the most appropriate for an analysis of the Mahaweli Project in general and the relation between officials and farmers in particular. It will be based on the analysis of four major aspects: (i) the complexity of the technical infrastructure, (ii) the productivity and functional differentiation of households and local communities, (iii) the relative autonomy of local organizations, and (iv) the qualitative aspects of social integration of various sections of the population. As mentioned above, the macro-economic viability is a product of dynamic interaction between these four aspects. Such an approach essentially transcends narrow economic models which are usually used for evaluating the rentability of a project.

The main theme in this book revolves around the linkages between technology, centralized control and household economy. We assume that the role that a central authority, public or private, has to play in the management of production increases with the size and complexity of a technical system. However, this does not mean that the relationship involved is rigid or mechanical, but rather represents a general tendency. We, therefore suggest that a distinction is made between normative control and executive power. Normative control refers to the capability of the authorities to define and enforce rules guiding the activities of persons and organizations; executive power reflects the extent to which means of production and transport are directly owned and managed by an actor, public or private. So far, the Mahaweli Authority claims to control both, the norms and the factors of production, and this raises the question with regard to the optimal extent and the mix of such control. Generally speaking, it seems that the most efficient combination in complex systems like Mahaweli can be expected when the state combines low executive power with high normative control. According to our understanding, devolution does not mean the withdrawal of the state but, on the contrary, a situation where the state is in a position to defend public interests and take a firm stand against particularistic tendencies. In other words, the correlation between technological complexity and political authority is multifaceted: For large irrigation systems like Mahaweli, stability, transparency, and credibility of laws and regulations is highly functional, whereas direct involvement of the state in production related activities is not.

There has been a long academic debate regarding the historical links between "hydraulic society" and "despotic state" (Wittfogel, 195xxx). The classical argument states that the high dependency of a society on irrigated agriculture based on the continuous management of a complex irrigation infrastructure gives monopolistic control to a class of bureaucrats managing irrigation systems and agricultural production. It further states that the problem lies in the far-reaching dependency of large sections of the population on the services of an irrigation bureaucracy. This state bureaucracy tends to eventually develop a conservative tendency, promoting rigid social and ideological structures which, in the long run, retard dynamic development.

It has often been pointed out that this bleak picture reflects historical conditions in China, Mesopotamia, Egypt and other societies dependent on large river irrigation, but did correspond to the historical situation of Sri Lanka. Behind this apparent exception lies the difference between the significance of irrigated agriculture as such and the type of irrigation technology involved. If "large scale" irrigation is based on a multitude of decentralized water sources like in Sri Lanka, there is no logical reason why centralized political authority should be envisaged. And in fact, though Sri Lanka heavily depended on irrigation during medieval times, she did not witness such type of political authority. Contrary to the argument put forward by some social historians (Leach 19XXX, Gunawardena 19XXX), the condition associated with "oriental despotism" is not the dependency on irrigated agriculture as such, but the size and complexity of irrigation structures: centralized control of large river-based irrigation systems versus decentralized tank irrigation. When this point is taken into account, the so-called exceptionality of Sri Lanka, where small tank irrigation prevailed, clearly conforms to the classical theory.

The Sri Lankan scene has, however changed with the appearance of the Mahaweli project. Since 1980, a centralized management structure deals with a complex river irrigation system covering nearly one third of the country's cultivated paddy area. Based on historical evidence alone, it would not be surprising if a movement towards a kind of "oriental despotism" develops once the state has taken over a direct productive role in the vital food sector. In concrete terms, we could expect a tendency towards: (i) a weakening of local and regional authority and increasing farmers' direct exposure to state institutions; (ii) growing density of state regulations in irrigated agriculture and other fields; (iii) more direct control of production process by state officials; (iv) and intensification of ideological representations of personalized state power. However, the relative significance of Mahaweli in the present context is not the same as it would have been in the medieval period. If the fact that Sri Lanka is already integrated within the modern world system, one may raise the question whether the emergence of a "despotic" system can still be expected. The reasons why such a development is unlikely are the following. Firstly: state revenue does not depend any more, as in the past, on the appropriation of peasant surplus. In modern Sri Lanka, such exploitation takes place more in the context of the plantation sector, and, in recent years, also of the export oriented Free Trade Zones. Secondly: food has become a world commodity and can easily be imported. Guaranteeing food security to a large majority of the population has become a basis of the legitimacy of political regimes wordwide. Therefore, the food sector is more subsidized than taxed. Most important perhaps is the third argument: The construction work has been largely financed by Western countries. In the short run, they insist on economic profitability to ensure recovery of loans. In the long run, they expect the growth of sufficient democratic control so that bureaucratic inertia within a "despotic" political environment is unlikely to develop. We are not concerned here with the social costs of such a scenario but are referring to the limited applicability of historical experience due to changed macro-parameters. Unlike in the past, today powerful external interests militate against the development of an almighty centralized bureaucracy. Devolution therefore is expected to take place even against bureaucratic resistance.

At this point we wish to return to the question relating to the relationship between the peasant producers and the state. If it is agreed that the state has to rely more on normative control than executive power, the question arises as to how to distinguish between those functions which could in part be executed locally or by autonomous organizations, and those which are at present unsatisfactorily carried out by the state but would require tighter control.

3) IMPERATIVES OF MAHAWELI

So far in this introductory chapter, we have attempted to give an account of diverse and complex forces at work in the context of Mahaweli. Mahaweli is an arena in which different groups, i.e. settlers, officials, politicians, etc. pursue their often-divergent interest. However, it should become evident that the degree of freedom available for the different groups is determined by a number of systemic constraints. This means, whatever the options that are pursued, their viability should necessariy be assessed in terms of the imperatives outlined below.

 

Dealing with Complexity

Complexity results from the number and type of linkages in the structure of a system. As can be seen from map 3, Mahaweli is characterized by a high degree of complexity - a fact which will not change over time since it is built into the technical layout. However, complexity is not only determined by technical or rational considerations. The changing or persisting cropping patterns, population dynamics, changing demand and supply of energy, the nature and structure of national and local political constituencies, etc. are also factors which influence the decision-making process relating to allocation of water. In particular, three sources of complexity can be identified:

a) The size of the system: The amount of water available from Mahaweli river and its tributaries permits the diversion of substantial quantities of water into different regions of the island, resulting in a cascade of large irrigation systems integrated in an overall system with many bifurcations. In addition, thanks to the large storage tanks, the timing and the duration of the water flow can be regulated to a large extent. With this techno-ecological complexity, the need for political legitimization increases: In the future, water scarcity or abundance in a certain area will no more be considered as "natural". From now on, there will always be an element of human decision involved in the availability of water. Also, the maximization of benefits from the water available will inevitably include both, economic and political considerations.

b) The multifunctionality of the system: Like many similar schemes, Mahaweli technical structure has been so conceived as to facilitate the achievement of the twin-objectives of power generation and the expansion of irrigated agriculture. While the users of electricity and those using irrigation water for crop production do not necessarily share the same interests, the division of water resources between these two different uses is more than likely to persist into the future as a point of contention. Competition between these two sources of demand for water will operate in two different ways. First, as can be seen from map 3, about 80% of the hydropower installations are concentrated on the branch serving the north-eastern part of the country. The political decision to increase power production automatically increases the quantity of water available in the north-eastern down-stream areas and reduces the water available for the northern and northwestern systems. A second source of competition between electricity production and irrigation results from seasonal variations of water release. Hydropower generation responds mainly to the demand of urban and industrial consumers. The time when water is needed for electricity production does not necessarily coincides with the time when the downstream farmers need water for irrigation. Though all the water used for electricity production is subsequently available for irrigation, the time factor frequently results in conflicts which have to be solved within political institutions.

c) The Speed of construction: Due to acceleration, many different activities had to be performed simultaneously. The opportunity to learn from mistakes was practically non-existent; if during the planning stage one assumption was wrong, the mistake is often replicated within the whole system. Stepwise learning could not develop naturally. Instead, the process of construction had to be initiated on the basis of hypothetical assumptions with respect to the progress of work - assumptions which were utterly unrealistic, particularly in donwstream development.

It is not the acceleration as such, but the need for simultaneous action that resulted in a degree of complexity which was far beyond what any centralized authority could handle. Mahaweli Authority's response to this challenge was strong centralization of management functions. However, when the construction phase is over, for reasons discussed before, it has been proved that it is difficult to reverse the process though such new management style is imperative in order to create conditions favorable for longterm operation and maintenance. Otherwise the gains in terms of efficiency owing to centralization is likely to be neutralized by the loss of efficiency when the construction work is completed. Centralized control, however, continues to be indispensable in at least three vital areas such as: the maintenance of the head works, the distribution of water to the various systems (but not within the systems), and the prevention of normative uncertainties and vagaries'.

 

Sustainability

Sustainability basically aims at reproduction, not only of living systems, but also of technical and social systems. Mahaweli has become a vital factor in the food production sector of Sri Lanka; and the assets accruing from the vast investment made in material, political and social terms will have to be retained for many centuries to come. First of all, this means a stable balance between cultural and natural systems; then it includes the attainment and stabilization of high productivity for national food security as well as the necessary income for maintenance and operation of the technical infrastructure; finally the stability of social institutions which alone will guarantee material and spiritual health of future generations, must be guaranteed.

For the time being, reproduction in any of the three areas delineated above is not assured at all:

  • In the area of ecology, the damages involved are considerable due to increased destruction of forests, and consequent soil erosion. No reforestation programme will be able to keep pace with the speed at which natural degradation resulting from the opening up of the Mahaweli Development Project takes place. Since, at the same time, natural soil fertility can be expected to decline, the related cost will presumably extend far beyond what increased production can compensate for.
  • The sustainability of the technical system probably is monitored best, at least for the headworks. On the F- and D-canal level, however, no prognoses are possible yet and nobody knows how maintenance is going to be performed: regularly and financed primarily by the farmers through water tax, or irregularly, and financed primarily by the state through occasional and costly rehabilitation. In this respect, the well documented impoverishment of large sections during the initial years as well as the tendency towards the contraction of farm size due to land fragmentation in the second generation are less than promising.
  • Social reproduction is the third area in which sustainability would be vital. If the goal seems more distant than ever, the reason for this in historical, economic and political conditions. Mainly for political reasons, the composition of local settler communities is heterogeneous with regard to their origin and social background - but may be homogeneous in terms of their party affiliation. This configuration is clearly detrimental to mutual aid and social cooperation on local level but tends to strengthen patron-client relationships. The local self-help capacity, therefore, is negatively affected. In addition, if we take the hardships of the initial years into consideration, together with the slow progress of income generation, we must predict defensive and family-centered attitudes which contradict the entrepreneurial spritit so often evocated for a better future. Counter-acting forces capable of neutralizing these unfavorable conditions - be they political or economic - cannot still be descerned.

 

It seems that Mahaweli resettlement project (as against power production scheme) can be expected to move in a positive direction only if the three conditions required for sustainability are carefully respected: Sustainable nature-culture relation, sustainable technical systems, and sustainable social structure. Whereas the first condition requires a strong state, able and willing to effectively defend the interests of the yet unborn generations, the second condition could perhaps best be realized by applying a "double standard" to the management of an irrigation system: normative rules at the macro-level, entrepreneurial style at the micro-level (cf. Merrey's contribution). Compared to the ecological and managerial conditions which can be arranged from the top, the promotion of the third condition indispensable for sustainability turns out to be more difficult: Social integration on local level cannot be ordered from above. To come closer to the desired end, what is needed are patience, reliability of rules and regulations, and confidence in the self-management capacities of the farmers. Since "farmers" are a rather heterogeneous group in terms of class-, gender- and age differences, vulnerable groups have to be identified and thereafter taken care of, and strengthened. In a context like Mahaweli, it is expected that economic growth can only gather momentum after the conditions for sustainable development have been generated. One of the basic criteria for such change is the equitable access to means of production and public services.

 

Economic Growth and Differentiation

Mahaweli can be seen from different angles: an irrigation cum resettlement project with additional electricity production, or an hydro-power project with a social component in the downstream sections. In fact, both is equally true. From a sociological point of view, the resettlement and land-to-the-tiller component is dominant; from an economic point of view, hydro-power generation is more relevant. At any specific point in time, the two modes of water use are competitive; in the long run, and in a structural analysis, they can become complementary.

Under what conditions are they complementary, or competitive? When analysing the current difficulties in Mahaweli, it has to be kept in mind that Mahaweli was originally moulded within a potentially dynamic development model. According to this model, the small-farmer sector would have played a leading role. Wide-spread surplus production would result in an increasing market integration and functional differentiation. Broad-based local demand then would generates favorable conditions for local craftmanship and trade which in turn may absorb the second generation of the settlers. Availability of electricity in the countryside would eventually play a catalytic role in this process thereby reducing rural-urban migration.

Since income generation from agricultural production falls far behind expectations, and the second generation already searching for an existence before agricultural surplus is available to a relevant extent, the economic assumptions involved have become untenable and with it the material basis for sustainable development. Why we insist that in Mahaweli economic growth can only gather momentum after the conditions for sustainable development have been generated, is is precisely because the socio-economic parameters are no more the same due to the loss of the crucial initial years. When this fundamental fact is accepted, interventions can no longer be guided by the old model. Under the new conditions, economic growth and differentiation in agriculture are no longer functioning as a force driving society towards a higher quality of life. More probable, the small-holding sector becomes more marginalized and will remain subsistence oriented (cf. Vergani). It may well turn out that the benefits from electricity production, instead of generating non-agricultural economic growth, will have to be used for subsidizing the down-stream paddy farmers on below-subsistence-level plots and very limited alternative income opportunities. Should this be the case, the hydro-power component of Mahaweli is another - albeit extremely costly - Sri Lankan investment to curb rural-urban migration.

 

4) CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PRESENT VOLUME

The present volume contains fourteen papers dealing with diverse aspects of the AMP. For convenience of analysis and presentation, they are classified into several groups as follows:

a) AMP - its rationale and interests involved

b) Ecology and Technical structure

c) Economics of the AMP

d) Resettlement Process

e) Organizational Development and Change

f) Grass-roots level Development

The purpose of the present section is simply to introduce the papers in the same sequence as they are arranged in the present publication. No attempt is made to provide a systematic summary for want of space. However, in the pages that follow, attention is focused on some of the salient points discussed in the papers.

 

Rationale of Accelerated Mahaweli Programme

Mahee Wickramaratne's paper points to the interplay of interests that shaped the initial push towards the acceleration of the process of implementation of the Mahaweli project in the late 1970''s. The aspirations of the newly elected UNP regime, readiness of the external funding agencies to assist a government with an explicit liberal economic outlook and a technocratic elite more oriented towards the engineering aspects of the project together constituted the driving force behind the AMP in its initial stages.

The alignment and the composition of interest groups have not been static over time. The changes involved have continually influenced the process of implementation of the project at times with significant consequences. The vast array of these dynamics and their consequences get even further outlined in the comments that are annexed to the paper. Of particular interest may be the map produced by H.-P. Müller visualizing the difference between the Master Plan of UNDP and the AMP as realized till the early 1990`s.

 

Mahaweli Technical Structure and Its Sustainability

Kapila Gunasekara's paper in the main examines the issue of sustainability of the Mahaweli system from both an environmental as well as a managerial point of view with particular attention to the effects of acceleration. The paper identifies the effects of environmental degradation in terms of soil erosion and deforestation in the upper watershed areas on the technical system, in particular the upper catchment reservoirs and the likely impact of the resulting reduced capacity on system performance, both power generation and irrigation. Attention is also drawn to the fact that the reduced time frame owing to the acceleration did provide little time for reviewing the on-going construction work in the downstrean areas thereby affecting the quality and efficacy of at least some of the lower irrigation structures.

Gunasekara's paper emphasizes the importance of the implementation of a vigorous environmental conservation programme in the upper catchment areas with a view to containing soil erosion and deforestation which will have serious consequences for the sustainability of the technical structure. While highlighting the value of improved and more efficient irrigation techniques and water and soil conservation methods in the downstream settlements, this paper also points to the need for studying worse case situations through simulation modelling of the technical system with a view to devising contingency plans for such situations.

 

Economics of the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme

The papers by Tambipille Jogaratnam and Giovanni Vergani introduced in this section draw attention to some of the macro-economic aspects of the Mahaweli project. While the first paper deals directly with the AMP, the second one examines the possible macro-economic implications of the redistribution of productive resources in the country resulting from the AMP.

In his paper, Jogaratnam argues that the changed macro-economic climate in the late 1970's i.e. increasing fuel prices and rising unemployment, was largely responsible for the shift in emphasis from agriculture to power generation in the context of Mahaweli. The paper points to the most significant and tangible outcomes of the project, namely, increased hydro power generation amounting to about 50% of the total availability and the substantial reduction of rice imports due to increased production in the country owing to Mahaweli downstream development. These gains have resulted in substantial savings in foreign exchange. Even though the estimated ERR of about 10% indicates the relative economic viability of AMP, a substantial reduction in rice and oil prices could drive ERR to a much lower figure.

Vergani's paper identifies a set of criteria for demarcating the basic agricultural types in the main agro-climatological zones of Sri Lanka, namely the Dry, the Intermediate and the Wet. It outlines a methodology for simulating effects which result from hypothetical changes in agro-economic parameters. The paper then examines the expected repercussions on the agricultural sector in Sri Lanka as a whole with more land and water being made available in the Dry Zone owing to the implementation of the Mahaweli project.

The production model presented and discussed reflects a positive supply response, but variability in demand has not been introduced into the model. So, while the models could be used to explain producer behaviour, the effects of changes in demand could not be ascertained. Another significant drawback of the model is that the scale of economies associated with irrigation technology cannot be investigated.

The discussion in the paper also points to the potentials for regional specialization and the distributional implications thereof. The assumption of self-sufficiency in rice is, however a weakness of the model. The potential income effects on the structure of demand has not been paid any attention.

 

Resettlement Process

The three papers included in this chapter deal with diverse aspects of the resettlement process associated with the accelerated Mahaweli Programme. While the papers by Thayer Scudder and Frank Dunnill deal with the process of resettlement in general, Ruwani Jayawardena's paper discusses aspects of healthcare planning as an integral part of settlement planning.

Scudder examines the diverse constraints that have acted against the social and economic advancement of Mahaweli settlers. In this context, he recognizes the crucial significance of the initial support for the settlers and the adverse consequences of the absence of such initial interventions. The paper also highlights the negative effect of the deviation of the authorities from the stated policies, in particular those relating to settler selection.

Dunnill examines the evolution of the AMP through a process of convergence of, and interaction between, donors, national political leadership and the technocrats. He examines the adverse effect of initial bias towards engineering work and the top-down approach adopted by the implementing agencies on the process of social development. The paper points out that, as a result, human development side of the AMP suffered with serious consequences.

Paper by Jayawardena focuses attention on the virtual neglect of public health aspects of settlement planning in the context of the AMP and its serious consequences for settler health, well-being and productivity. She points out how the construction programme has been carried out in the downstream areas without much concern for its adverse public health consequences such as spread of malaria. As the paper points out, the weaknesses have been associated not only with preventive health. It has been even more so with the curative side, no adequate facilities for treatment being provided in the initial stages.

 

Organizational Development and Change

Given the scale and the complexity of the AMP and the speed at which it was scheduled to be implemented, the establishment of an elaborate organizational structure to implement the project was not surprising at all.The hierarchical, bureaucratic structure that took charge of the implementation of the programme of infrastructure development and resettlement naturally adopted a top-down approach which in effect promoted settler dependence on officials. It is this state of affairs which has become a major obstacle to the development of viable, self-reliant settler organizations capable of managing local resources. It is not so much the realization of this fact that has led the authorities and donors to review the present Mahaweli management structure as the budgetary constraints emanating from the reduced central government allocations as well as the donor insistence on cost recovery or at least sharing of costs.

Douglas Merrey, in his paper, recognizes the need for organizational reform in the context of the present Mahaweli administration. However, for him, one of the basic motives of such reform should be to facilitate the establishment of viable farmer organizations. The main thrust of his argument seems to be that, while it is necessary to maintain the core of the centralized administration in order to ensure rational control and allocation of water resources, field-level officials should be so organized as to allow them to behave more like entrepreneurs responding to farmer requirements. Such a management environment would also be conducive to the development of self-reliant farmer organizations capable of negotiating with the officials on an equal footing.

Jayantha Jayawardana's paper provides an overview of the management structures of diverse agencies which have managed irrigation development and peasant settlement schemes in Sri Lanka including the AMP. It identifies the reasons behind the currents efforts at the reorganization of the Mahaweli agencies. Having being a Mahaweli official himself, Jayawardena provides an account of the way Mahaweli administration evolved, in particular at the project level. Turning to farmer participation, he identifies the crucial role the organized local-level farmers could play in the operation and maintenance of the lower level irrigation structures and other resources.

Jayantha Perera's paper deals with the problems and prospects of farmer organizations in the context of Mahaweli settlements. Basing largely on his experience with the farmer organization programme in system B, he draws our attention to the challenges that an externally initiated farmer organization programme may face. i.e., political interference, resistance from local opinion leaders, lack of interest on the part of the farmers, bureaucratic control of local organizations, etc. The author also poses the question whether the settlers could be persuaded to form farmer organizations while they are still struggling with problems of survival.

 

Grass-roots-level Development

The four papers included in the last chapter focus attention on the grass-roots level conditions that obtain in some of the Mahaweli settlements. They provide us with some indications as to how macro-programmes get translated into local idiom in terms of both time and space.

Dharshini Rajapaksha's paper based on her field research in a Mahaweli settlement specializing in OFC's (field crops other than paddy) attempts to explain the process of social differentiation from an historical-structural perspective. In doing so, she highlights the importance of pre-existing resource endowments prior to migration as a determinant of the process of differentiation. The paper also argues that the integration of local communities into large settlement schemes results in intra-family differentiation leading to an increased workload for women.

Joke Schrijver

Lionel Siriwardena, in his paper examines the significance of the origin of settlers in the process of their adaptation in the new environment and the performance as farmers. This is done through a comparison of three settlement units with different settler configurations in terms of origin. The paper also focuses attention on the evident conflict of interests between the officials and the farmers. The picture that emerges is that, instead of working together to achieve a set of common objectives, the officials and the farmers are by and large at cross purposes resulting in a constant struggle to outwit each other.

And finally, S.L. Thilakasiri's paper highlights the instability of the land tenure system that is imposed on the Mahaweli settlements indicating how similar are the tenurial changes that take place across different settlement schemes. As in the other settlement situations, the emergent informal land market has made a mockery of the formal system of land tenure. Paper also identifies various factors that contributes to the social differentiation such as differential access to water and quality of soil in the allottments.

 

 

Appendix: Memorandum to MASL

The participants at the Symposium on Mahaweli held at Monte Verità (Switherland) from 23 - 28 August 1992 were impressed by the achievements of the AMP, in particular, with regard to the targets for electrical power generation. However, it was also noted that, as far as downstream settler development is concerned, despite the best efforts that have been made, there is still much to be desired. Many settlers seem to have had a bad start due to various circumstances and as a result, they have not been able to break away from poverty. In view of this state of affairs, it was felt that it is time for reviewing the current settler development programmes and take remedial measures to rectify the drawbacks as much as possible.

1. While recognizing the fact that the realization of the potentials of the AMP rests as much on the success of its human development programme as on the successful completion of the physical planning components, it was agreed that there was an urgent need to strengthen the institutional arrangements relating to the former at the executive level within the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka. It was felt that a senior advisor with a strong human development orientation should be placed next to the Director-General so that the latter could be expeditiously and competently informed of the economic and social needs of the Mahaweli settlers.

2. In order to make wide-ranging expert advise on human development issues available to both the advisor-in-charge and the MASL administration, the need to appoint a panel of Sri Lankan experts was also recognized. The panel of experts on human development may help the administration to monitor and guide the processes of social and economic development in the settlement areas.

3. In view of the urgent need for strengthening the settler development programme, it was felt that funding agencies and certain non-governmental agencies should continue to play a significant part in the current phase of Mahaweli development. This is particularly so because the realization of the major project objectives, in particular those relating to socio-economic development, will depend as much on the continued support as on the initial investments.

4. It seems to us that the aid community can, with the assent of the Government of Sri Lanka, make a significant contribution by providing funds to help settlers to form associations and small farmers cooperatives for purposes chosen by themselves. We have in mind a trust on the lines of the one that was started by the Europea Community in Zone 2 of System C, working with settlers at the grass-roots and especially (as is being done by the Duch-financed team in System C) with women who want to obtain credit for a variety of practical purposes. We think, that the Trust should have settlers on its Board, should be based downstream and should go out of its way to give settlers children practical experience of work in appropriate fields. It would also have distinguished Sri Lankans and one or two experienced and sympathetic foreigners on its Board, which would meet and conduct its business in the field - in close touch with the settlers. Such a Trust, we believe, could play a supportive and complementary role to EIED and various donor-assisted programmes in generating employment opportunities.

5. Poverty and ill-health among settler families tend to reduce their productivity. The multiplier effects of such a situation can be detrimental to the achievement of overall development objectives. This necessitates the early identification of particularly vulnerable groups such as marginalized women, the dispossessed, children and the unemployed so that specific programmes of health and development support can be targetted towards them.

6. In view of the accepted state policy of participatory management of irrigation resources, a concerted effort should be made to identify and support local initiatives even in the field of irrigation management. Moreover, local initiatives in other areas, such as housing, primary healthcare, nutrition and credit should also be encouraged and promoted. Strengthening of settler associations will no doubt promote settler commitment and facilitate sharing of costs between the state and the local communities. It was also felt that the best approach to local institution building is to promote grass-roots level self-help initiatives and facilitate horizontal exchange of information using simple communication media such as news letters and face to face interaction.

7. Many settler communities are characterized by a high degree of social disorganization as exemplified by intra-community conflicts, abuse of alcohol, high rate of suicide, and widespread violation of rules, regulations and norms. While efforts at community organization may help increase social cohesion, specific programmes aimed at reducing the above social problems will have to be designed and implemented.

8. In recognition of the fact that there is already a considerable body of research information on diverse aspects of Mahaweli and that there is no systematic effort to make use of this information for planning and implementation purposes, it was felt that it would be useful to evolve an internal process whereby the available research material can be perused and applied for planning and implementation purposes.



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VICTORIA  PROJECT


The Project - The Evaluation - The Main Findings - Lessons
The Project
The Victoria project is part of the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme (AMDP). It is a power and irrigation project, but the irrigation component consists only of water storage in the reservoir behind the Victoria Dam. The project cost in excess of Rs 9000m, including £113m (Rs 6557m) of British grant aid, and was inaugurated in April 1985.
The Evaluation
The evaluation report was prepared by a team comprising an economist, engineer, sociologist, and environmentalist, led by a member of the ODA Evaluation Department. The work included a three week visit to Sri Lanka in May 1986.
The evaluation report re-assesses the project shortly after its completion. The report contains some important lessons for planning similar projects or indeed any major construction project in the future, and makes recommendations to assist in the future operation of the project. The numerous detailed conclusions and recommendations are readily accessible in the 30 page summary in Volume I.
Careful management and monitoring of the project by all concerned helped ensure that the civil, electrical and mechanical works were completed successfully, on time and within the original budget, in spite of some difficult problems which arose during construction.
The main focus of the study was on the social, environmental and economic aspects from which it was thought the main lessons were to be learned. These lessons are summarised below.
The Main Findings
About 30,000 people were displaced by the project, over four times the number predicted:
● Although implemented without outside assistance the resettlement programme
after a slow and very uncertain start was achieved within the necessary timetable. ● The lack of advance planning, the small number of staff and the initial underestimation of the number of people affected, meant that the programme was implemented under severe time pressure.
● This necessitated concentration on the immediate problems of property 
acquisition, compensation and resettlement, to the detriment of longer-term resettlement planning; this imposed unnecessary costs on the settlers.

The environment created by the dam is dynamic and complex: ● A number of aspects require management.
● In the absence of management plans drawn up prior to development these issues were being addressed (in May 1986) on an ad-hoc basis, but there were insufficient funds and a lack of focus and direction.
● Problems, such as control of water levels in the dam, prevention of malaria below the dam, poor water quality in lakeside settlements might have been lessened and the exploitation of benefits (fisheries, recreation, and a heightened awareness of the need for watershed management) might have been increased had environmental issues received greater attention during appraisal and project monitoring.
● Assistance for remedial measures has been offered by the British Government and is being considered with the Sri Lankan government.
The re-estimated rate-of-return is 8% about 4% less than that at appraisal, mainly because power output is now expected to be less than forecast in 1978 and the prospects for irrigation benefits are poor.
● But allocating the costs of Victoria between the power and irrigation components
shows that the project is a cost-effective means of power generation.
● The power output from Victoria depends on how the river systems are managed, and on how other power plants and the irrigation schemes are operated. The trade-offs are particularly complex.
● It is likely that continued improvements in planning and operational planning will increase the returns to Victoria and other Maheweli projects taken together.
The Sri Lanka Electricity Board which now owns and operates the Victoria power station is in a much healthier financial position than in 1978. This is as much due to substantial increases in tariffs and improved management as to the expansion in sales which the Victoria and other projects have made possible.
Lessons
● More comprehensive planning and more extensive data at the outset (had either
been available) might have improved the economic returns.
● It is very difficult to maximise benefits from power and irrigation projects in the absence of comprehensive studies of the systems to which they contribute.
-- Preparation of such studies requires a mass of hydrological, financial, agricultural, social and environmental data and computer models developed over a number of years.
-- The best way to achieve this is through development of the local institutions concerned. Short term and partial studies by consultants are neither a cost-effective nor a professionally adequate substitute. In this instance there was not much alternative given the severe time constraints.
● Long term planning and project preparation by both recipient institutions and aid agencies might help avoid similar predicaments in the future, and thereby secure higher rates 
professionally adequate substitute. In this instance there was not much alternative given the severe time constraints.

● Long term planning and project preparation by both recipient institutions and aid agencies might help avoid similar predicaments in the future, and thereby secure higher rates of return.
● Projects such as Victoria require detailed attention to social and environmental matters at the appraisal stage. A lack of knowledge and understanding about them involves a degree of risk.
● Inadequate attention to social matters reduces the efficiency with which resettlement programmes can be implemented and impose unnecessary cost on evacuees and governments. This could cause financial crisis and lead to projects being halted.
● Clear understanding of the environmental issues at appraisal facilitates better arrangements for dealing with a range of problems (such as weed control and malaria prevention) and provides a better basis for exploiting the environmental benefits.

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KOTMALE PROJECT

https://www.google.com/url?q=https://utvecklingsarkivet.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/1991-2-A-Flawed-Success-An-Evaluation-of-SIDA-Support-to-the-Kotmale-Hydropower-Project.pdf&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwj985TWvr-RAxW11DgGHcCPMwsQFnoECAoQAg&usg=AOvVaw11CookSxzOXQnUGFb4-8CE


A FLAWED SUCCESS
An Evaluation of SIDA Support to the Kotmale Hydro Power Project

 SUMMARY

The Kotmale Hydropower Project is the project in the Mahaweli Development Programme located furthest upstream. It is a multipurpose project, serving both power production and irrigation needs.
This evaluation report is an attempt to give a technical and economic ex post review of the project. Separate reviews have been performed regarding the environmental effects of the project and on the socio-economic effect of the relocation of four thousand families living in the affected areas.
The evaluation has been sponsored by SIDA, the main purpose being to examine the extent to which the project achieved its objectives as these were stated in the 1982 decision of the Swedish Parliament to provide significant assistance to the project.
A secondary objective has been to provide lessons for the planning of future projects of this nature to the Government of Sri Lanka and the donor community.
The report concludes that the project has suffered from rush planning and start-up. The basic design features were not optimal for the given geological conditions, and the absence of competition in the selection of contractor and equipment supplier together with  costly design - mostly on the Client's insistence - eventually led to an unnecessarily costly project.
It is the Mission's opinion that the leakages in the unlined part of the pressure shaft followed by a shutdown of the plant for repairs could have been avoided had rock pressure testing and ensuing change of design been performed during the excavation of the tunnel and shaft.
The Swedish Government, although having financed 68% of the foreign exchange component of the project, had little or no influence on design,

selection of consultants, contractors and equipment suppliers. The SIDA- appointed Team of Experts that was brought into the picture after the Parliament's decision to provide assistance to the project could influence only the progress of construction work already defined by contracts and specifications.
The implementation of the project was carried out professionally and efficiently, and the power plant as it now stands is of a very high standard. Being properly maintained and operated in the future, the Kotmale will continue to play an important role in Sri Lanka's power supply.
The economic evaluation that has been carried out based on thermal energy as an alternative to Kotmale's hydropower, resulted in a relatively low internal rate of return. A high oil price scenario combined with strict claims to profitability on the alternative thermal energy production (8%) is necessary in order to bring Kotmale's internal rate of return above 6%. In all three oil
price scenarios the internal rate of return from Kotmale is lower than the rate of return demanded from thermal power.
The main findings from the economic evaluation of Kotmale can be summarized as follows:
• Regarded strictly as a hydropower scheme, Kotmale gives a small economic return compared with regular standards. The return is, however, definitely positive.
• The delayed production start together with the repair costs are factors vvith important effect on the economic return.
• Prospects of high oil prices would improve the project's viability.
• Kotmale also serves irrigation purposes and contributes as well to the economy of hydropower plants downstream. Thus there are reasons to claim that paris of Kotmale's construction costs should be shared with other projects.
• Further attendance to the needs of the evacuees which might even triple the relocation costs, would not gravely deteriorate the economy of the project.

SIDA Evaluation Report 2/91

 

(PDF) Restraining conflicts through institutional interventions: The case of Mahaweli, Sri Lanka


Restraining conflicts through institutional interventions: The case of
Mahaweli, Sri Lanka.
ERN Gunawardena1 and KN Wickramaratne2
1/ South Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies (SaciWATERs),
Hyderabad, India
2/ Mahaweli Auhority of Sri Lanka, Digana, Sri Lanka
Introduction
Sri Lanka receives rain mainly through two monsoons; northeast monsoon (Maha)and
southwest (Yala) monsoon. The Wetzone occupies south western part of the country and
receives rainfall from both monsoons and, thus more suitable for plantation crops. The
Dryzone, which constitute the balance 2/3rd of Sri Lanka receives rain only from
northeast monsoon, hence requires supplementary irrigation to cultivate both Maha and
Yala seasons. The flat terrain, higher solar radiation and fertile soil make Dryzone ideal
for irrigated paddy, the staple food of Sri Lankan.
Therefore, irrigated agriculture was developed as far back as 2500 years ago in the
Dryzone of the country. The historians characterize this early Sri Lankan society as a
“hydraulic civilization” (Leach, 1959). The invention of bisokotuwa or Valve Pit, the
counterpart of the sluice which regulates the flow of water from a modern reservoir tank,
has made the construction of large dams possible in 3rd Century AD. River diversion
work through the construction of weirs across the longest river in Sri Lanka, Mahaweli
was carried out in 495 AD to augment the larger reservoirs build in the Dryzone. Ever
since, constructions of reservoirs and augmentation from river diversions have continued
with the thriving civilization in the Dryzone.
There was a greater socio-ecomonic change after the colonial rule in 1818. Forests in the
headwaters of the Wetzone were cleared for plantation crops and the irrigated agriculture
was neglected at least till mid 1980s (De Silva, 2005). Foreign exchange was earned by
exporting tea and rice was imported. However, irrigation policy was changed in mid
1880s with an attempt to revive the ancient network of irrigation channels and tanks in
the Dryzone. A new agricultural policy came in to effect with the appointment of a Sri
Lankan as the first Minister of Agriculture of Lands in the colonial government in 1930,
who subsequently became the first Prime Minster of Sri Lanka. In this new policy,
irrigation was the predominant element, and its objectives were tow fold, namely to
increase paddy production of country and to enable more people to settle on the lands in
the Dryzone. Its purpose was to reduce unemployment and lessen the pressure of the
population in the Wetzone (Manchanayake and Madduma Bandara, 1999). During this
period, he started number of colonization schemes by restoring ancient irrigation works,
such as Minneriya, Minipe, Elahera, Kalawewa, Allai-Kantale, Parakrama Samudra and
Padawiya. He was instrumental in constructing the first multipurpose reservoir in Sri
Lanka, Senanayaka Samudraya of 950 MCM capacity irrigating 48000 ha in the Gall Oya
valley and its settlements. It is also appropriate to mention that this multipurpose project
was undertaken without any donor assistance. Successive governments after
independence have heavily invested on expanding irrigated agriculture in the Dryzone to
achieve self sufficiency in staple food, rice, as well as other subsidiary crops. A large
number of irrigation schemes were either rehabilitated or newly developed after the
independence until the biggest ever investment was made in implementing the Mahaweli
Ganga Development Project (MGDP).
Mahaweli Ganga Development Project
In 1951, the Government of Sri Lanka had obtained assistance from the government of
Canada , under the Colombo Plan Programme, to undertake a survey by aerial
photography to evaluate and prepare an inventory of the land and water resources of the
country including the Mahaweli basin. The inventory identified potentialities for the
development of 425 MW of hydropower and irrigation of 270,000 ha of land.
To implement the project, the first feasibility study for Mahaweli Development was
carried out under an agreement with the United State Operation Mission (presently
USAID) during the period from 1958 to 1961, jointly with the irrigation Department (ID).
The recommendations were then presented to the Parliament in 1962. There was a strong
objection to this proposal based on the fact that this diversion as a part Mahaweli from its
upper reaches near Kandy to adjacent dry zone in the North Central Province had done
without studying the overall potential for development of the entire land and water
resources in the Mahaweli, particularly in its own basin lower down (Cooke, 2003).
The Parliament did not approve the USAID recommendation and requested the UNDP to
undertake an independent comprehensive study. The Government of Sri Lanka has signed
an agreement with the UNDP/FAO in 1963 to prepare a master plan to develop the
Mahaweli basin, which has the largest potential for both hydropower generation and
irrigated agriculture in the Dryzone. The master plan which was completed in 1969
proposed the development of Mahaweli basin in 3 phases over a period of 30 years
(Cooke, 2003). This master plan envisaged the development of 350,000 ha of land,
including 97,000 ha existing irrigable lands, in Mahaweli and 6 allied basins, as shown in
Figure 1, and install hydropower capacity of about 600 MW.
The MGDP originally planned for the implementation over a 30-year period was
commenced in 1970 with the World Bank Assistance. The MGDP was brought to
acceleration in 1979, as a major political decision of the government which came to
power in 1977 with an unprecedented majority. Many friendly donor countries offered
financial assistance to the new government to pull it out of its economic difficulties.
Stable government with 5/6th majority in the Parliament along with the open market
policies, the first country to introduced such policies in South Asia, may have prompted
the donors to help Sri Lanka with this largest investment ever made in its history. By
accelerating the MGDP, the government expected to solve many issues including
unemployment, food shortage and energy crisis. For example, the official unemployment
figure stood at 2 million in 1977 with an annual increment to the workforce of about
125,000. At this time, 1/3 of the annual budget was spent on importing essential food
items. The demand for electricity has increased from 6% in 1977 to 15% in 1978 in the
rapidly expanding commercial and industrial sector, such as those in the Free Trade Zone,
due to the government policy to liberalize the economy.
In order to harness the resources that were required for the MGDP, a “Sri Lanka Aid
Group” was formed in Paris in 1978 and the World Bank coordinated its activities. The
financial assistance to complete the major headwork and down stream area development
came from, UK, Sweden, Canada, Germany, USA, Australia, Netherlands, Japan, Kuwait,
China, World Bank, ADB, OPEC, European Economic Community and UN Agencies
(Cooke, 2003).
A strong organization called Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL) was created to
implement the MGDP through Mahaweli Authority Act No 23 of 1979. This act has wide
range of powers to ensure that the MGDP is implemented without any hindrance. For
example, existing irrigable lands, minor tanks and forests were acquired and incorporated
them in designing a new irrigation infrastructure. Two agencies namely Mahaweli
Engineering and Construction Agency (MECA) and Mahaweli Economic Agency (MEA)
were created under MASL. The MECA was responsible for down stream development
which included planning, designing and construction of irrigation and social
infrastructure. The MEA was responsible for, a) integrated development and management
of the downstream areas of the Mahaweli involving settlements of farm families and
provision of agricultural and social services for socio-economic upliftment of the
community and, b) operation and maintenance of upstream settlements areas of
reservoirs built under the MGDP.
With the completion of the MGDP in mid 1980s, emphasis was shifted from construction
activities to operation and maintenance of the system.
Potential conflicts
Conflicts occur when demand exceeds supply. Irrigated agriculture and hydroelectric
power generation are the two main sectors which uses the Mahaweli water. One of the
major constructions of the MGDP was the Polgolla barrage and associated tunnel to
divert water to the ancient reservoirs in the north central part of the country (Figure 2). A
total of 90,000 ha of water-short land received water through this diversion. Three
reservoirs, namely Victoria, Randenigala and Rantembe, were constructed across the
natural path of the Mahaweli which flows towards east, predominantly for power
generation. The installed capacity of power plants of the eastern reservoir cascade is more
than 10 times that of the plants along the north central path. Although the use of
Mahaweli water for irrigation and hydropower generation are to a large extent compatible,
conflicts do arise, particularly over the quantity to be diverted at Polgolla away from the
path of maximum generation head. Sending water along the eastern cascade to generate
more power is a financially attractive proposition though north central province is more
densely populated, consists of large number of ancient irrigated infrastructure and is also
politically more powerful. At the stage of drawing the master plan, 1270 MCM was
allocated as diversion to the north central province from Polgolla. However, in practice
this quantity has been reduced to 69% during last few years resulting 150% cropping
intensity. In contrast, irrigated lands in the eastern cascade receive more than adequate
amount of water and hence enjoy 200% cropping intensity. Allocating water in an
equitable and fair manner among large number of tanks in the water-short north central
province, as shown in Figure 2, has also become a problem since demand is always tends
to be higher than the supply. Inadequate water at the system level continued to create
conflicts among farmers when they try to share water. Therefore, conflicts arise at
national level between sectors, such as irrigation and hydropower and local level between
farmers in individual irrigation schemes.
In water allocation, priority is given to domestic uses, which is a small fraction of
irrigation issue at present and can easily be met. However, there are dry spells, which
require water releases and diversions from reservoirs to meet the domestic needs.
Conflicts generated due to transferring water out of traditional irrigation reservoirs for
domestic purpose can some time end up in courts as in the case of Thuruwila (Athukorala,
2006).
Institutional arrangement at national level
Anticipating conflicts as mentioned above, it became necessary to create a mechanism to
manage the water resources of the MGDP. It was sensible planning at the initial stage to
anticipate issues related to water allocation between sectors and users in view of growing
demands in agricultural and industrial development after the completion of MGDP. To
address this need of water allocation, management and monitoring, the Water
Management Panel (WMP) was established in 1985 at the head office of MASL. The
WMP is headed by the Director General of MASL and consists of all Heads of
Government Agencies concerned with the management and operation of the MGDP as
shown in Table 1. They consists of a)Director General of Irrigation Department,
b)Director General of Department of Agriculture c)Chairman of Ceylon Electricity Board
and d)Government Agents/District Secretaries of respective districts within Mahaweli
and 6 allied basins.
The WMP is assisted in its works by a technically specialized Water Management
Secretariat (WMS) constituted within the MASL. The WMS provides information and
recommendations to the WMP to assist it in reaching its operational policy decisions.
Once the decisions are made, the monitoring of the total programme is directed by the
WMS. The Director of WMS functions as the secretary to the WMP.
The WMS uses a multipurpose, multi-reservoir computer model ARSP (Acres Reservoir
Simulation Programme developed by ACRES International Ltd) to plan water allocation.
This model uses data on hydrology, crop and irrigation water requirement, energy
generation, systems status and diversion capacity of structures and maintenance
programme of power plants and other structures. At the beginning of each season WMS
prepares a System Operation Plan (SOP) for the cultivation season which gives operation
policy, allocation/distribution priorities and programme for the season for Mahaweli and
other allied basins (Abeygunawardena and Imbulana, 2005).
Each Mahaweli system has a Residential Project Manager (RPM) who is an
administrative head of the system. He is supported principally by two Deputy Residential
Project Managers (DRPM), one for irrigation and one for agriculture. Each system is
divided to blocks and units and managed by Block Managers and Unit Managers
respectively.
In addition to the MASL, which is the major user of water, there are number of other
institutions involved in managing water at national and local level as shown in Table 1.
These organizations are independent and operate under different ministries. However, all
these organizations in one way or another has to be involved in decision making process
in water allocation since they all operate within the Mahaweli area identified under the
Mahaweli Authority Act No 23 of 1979 as shown in Figure 1.
Institutional arrangement at system level
There had been a very sound irrigation management system in ancient Sri Lanka with the
participation of communities, especially in the management of irrigated infrastructure.
During the early period of British rule, the Colonial Government was preoccupied with
military and political consideration and thereafter in the development of plantations in the
Wetzone. In addition, the scorched-earth tactics adopted by the Colonial Government
during the Great Rebellion of 1817-18 destroyed the irrigation complexes in Uva, then a
prosperous region of the old Kandyan kingdom. The abolition of “Rakakariya” had its
destructive aspect for it involved the sudden demolition of the traditional communal
machinery which had kept the village irrigation facilities and the major tanks that were
still in use functioning and in a state of repair (De Silva, 2005). This traditional system
was revived to some degree in a different form with introduction of Paddy Land Act of
1958 that vested the power of management of minor systems with the Government Agent
who could appoint ‘vel vidanes’ in consultation with farmers to maintain and operate
systems. This system too was abolished with time especially when central agencies took
over this function in 1970s (Samarasinghe and Sumanasekera, 2005).
As an alternative to agency managed systems, the participatory and integrated approaches
to irrigation management were experimented in major irrigation systems in Sri Lanka
commencing from late 1970s. This intervention was made to ascertain as to how best the
participation of beneficiaries can be obtained in management of irrigation systems such
as the famous Gal Oya study (Uphoff and Wijerathna, 2000). However, these innovations
could not be sustained due to the absence of an agency and a working arrangement to
support these programmes after the project interventions were over. In addition, there
were isolated interventions like Minipe and Kimbulwana Oya where the participatory
approach was attempted to make improvement of water management by individual
officials of the ID but these interventions died down with the departure of the interested
persons.
Therefore, the then Ministry of Lands and Land Development which was in charge of
subject of management of major irrigation systems, established the Irrigation
Management Division in 1984 to implement the “Integrated Management of Irrigated
Agricultural Settlement (INMAS) in 35 major irrigation scheme commanding about
157,000 ha out of total area of about 250,000 ha under the preview of ID ((Samarasinghe
and Sumanasekera, 2005). Under this programme separate professionals were employed
at schemes level to organize farmers to form Field Canal Group at the lowest level of
hierarchy of the canal system as informal groups and Farmer Organizations (FOs) at
Distributory Canal level as formal organizations. In addition, it formed a Project
Management Committee (PMC) at scheme levels encompassing the farmer
representatives elected by farmer organizations and agency officials involved in
management of irrigation at scheme level. After having observed its success the ID and
MASL adopted similar models for participatory management in major irrigation systems
and Mahaweli systems not covered by the INMAS. These programmes were
implemented without legal recognition until the Agrarian Services Act was amended to
recognize FOs in 1990 and the Irrigation Ordinance was amended to recognize PMCs and
appointment of Project Managers in 1994. In 1989 the ID agreed in principle to hand over
the management of the system below the Distributory Canals to FOs formally and agreed
on a cost sharing mechanism with FOs after the Government of Sri Lanka accepted the
‘Joint Management’ as a policy. The MASL also adopted a similar strategy on transfer of
irrigation management of downstream areas with no cost sharing basis.
Though, there were mix results over the years commencing from Gal Oya experiments,
farmer organizations matured with time through interventions of various projects to
strengthen them. Though, Gal Oya was initially identified as a not so successful
intervention, later evaluations proved otherwise as reported by Uphoff and Wijerathna
(2000); “farmer organizations were established in the Gal Oya irrigation scheme in the
early 1980’s, which produced measurable improvements in system performance and
efficiency. In the 1997 dry season, after farmer were told that there was not water in the
reservoir to grow rice crop, they achieved through organization a better than average
harvest from 65000 acres by efficient and equitable distribution. Ethnic cooperation was
demonstrated by upstream sinhala farmers sharing water with downstream Tamil
farmers.”
Mahaweli System H, being the first downstream area developed under the MGDP, had a
luxury of continuous interventions by various donors to strengthen farmer organizations
Therefore, it was relatively easy for the MASL to go a step forward in System H after the
rehabilitation programme funded by the World Bank in 2002 to introduce bulk water
allocation concept to farmer organizations for self management. This programme resulted
in development of a demand driven water supply system within the area managed by the
community as against supply driven system that exist elsewhere in the Mahaweli system.
Table 1. Major Agencies Involved in Water Resources Management
(adopted from Birch and Muthukuda, 2000)
Agency Responsible for
Water Resources Management Major Water Related function
Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka
(MASL) Responsible for water resource allocation among g irrigation
and hydropower uses. Follow participatory approaches for
decision making and real-time management of water
resources in Mahaweli areas. Responsible for planning,
construction and operation and maintenance of multi-purpose
reservoirs, canals headworks and other structures, and for
dam safety. Promotion of soil conservation measures and
watershed management: monitor sedimentation levels in the
reservoirs; provide extension services for irrigated agriculture
in command areas.
Irrigation Department (ID) Operates the national level hydrology data system covering
18 rivers. Responsible for planning, construction and
operation and maintenance of irrigation, drainage and flood
control and drainage infrastructure. Also responsible for
implementation of seasonal planning for major and medium
irrigation schemes outside areas declared under the MASL
Act. It is also responsible for flood forecasting and control
and implementation drainage and salinity exclusion in
irrigation related projects.
Irrigation Management Division
(IMD) Promoting irrigation management through Project
Management Committee (PMC) at irrigation system level by
means of a co-ordination mechanism with all agencies
responsible for irrigated agriculture in 37 major irrigation
schemes. Strengthening participatory management of
irrigation schemes by promoting formation of farmer
organizations and farmer companies and training facilities
National Water Supply and
Drainage Board (NWSDB) Responsible for large development projects and system
operation and maintenance in the provision of water supply
for domestic an industrial uses. Coordinate rural water supply
projects with the involvements of CBOs and local authorities
Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) Responsible for hydro-power generation, hydro and thermal
mix up; long-term least cost generation planning and
development and maintaining hydropower plants and related
infrastructure
Department of Agriculture
(DOA) Involve in R & D and extension programme on water saving
technology on variety of crops, implementation of
agricultural policy, promotion of soil conservation and
watershed management programmes
District and Divisional
Secretaries District Secretary: Coordination of “Kanna” meetings for
irrigation water allocation. Implementation of irrigation
ordinance. Coordination of District Coordinating Committee,
District agricultural Committee and District Environmental
Committee. Divisional Secretary: Coordination of Divisional
Environmental Committee and Divisional Coordinating
Committee
Water allocation process
It is important to describe the water distribution system and institutional setup at the
project level before explaining the procedure followed in allocation of water. Water
stored in a reservoir is released through two main canals, right and left bank canals from
which branch canal originates. Water is delivered to a 1 ha farm plot of each farmer
through branch, distributory and field canal. Each farmer receives water through an
orifice from the field canal. As mentioned above all the farmers in a system has 1 ha each.
For example, the total irrigation extent in Mahaweli System H is 31500 ha and is
approximately equal to the number of farmers. This policy of allocating 1 ha land units
per farmer has been adopted in all irrigation systems by the government of Sri Lanka
unlike many parts of south Asia.
The water users associations, based on field canals are the lowest institutional units in
Mahaweli systems. This unit is called field canal association or Turn Out Farmer Group
(TOFG). Representative from TOFG forms under one Distributory canal forms in to a
Distributory Canal Farmer Organization (DCFO). Block Level Farmer Federation (BLFF)
consist of representatives from DCFOs are responsible for the preparation of cultivation
plan, manage bulk water allocation and arrange forward contracts to facilitate marketing
of products.
Water demand estimates starts from individual farmers in a field canal. The cropping
pattern and associated water requirement of each farmer is consolidated at the field canal,
distributory canal and given to BLFF. Aggregate requirement of BLFF produces the
system requirement. The RPM of different Systems of the MGDP send this requirement
to the WMS. A similar procedure is applied in irrigation systems within the MGDP
managed by the ID and the bulk water requirement for the system level is provided to the
WMS. The Ceylon Electricity Board provides information on plan availability and energy
and peak power demand over the season. All these information are used by the WMS to
prepare the Seasonal Operational Plan (SOP).
Platform for discussion and decision making
The SOP prepared by the WMS, taking into consideration of water demand and supply, is
discussed at the Pre-Seasonal WMP meeting that will be held with the participation of all
concerned agencies and ministry representatives and farmer representatives prior to
beginning of each season and approved. Table 2 provides the information on
representatives of relevant organizations, listed in Table 1, which met on 5th October
2006 in Kandy, Sri Lanka. The minutes of the meeting along with water allocation for
each irrigation scheme is given in the website of MASL (www.mahaweli.gov.lk) and,
therefore, known to all. The approved SOP gives details on projected reservoir releases,
energy generation (both hydro and thermal), projected diversions, reservoir behavior,
allocation of water for each irrigation scheme, projected reservoir storage at the end of
each month, sluice issue and expected rainfall calculated under average and dry weather
conditions, for reservoirs and irrigation schemes connected with Mahaweli development,
on monthly basis.
According to the minutes of the meeting, the Deputy Director of the WMS has briefed the
members on water issues, water consumption and extent cultivated in each Mahaweli
system. He also provided the comparison of seasonal water use value of 2006 Yala with
average 10 years values to make a point that water use efficiency in 2006 Yala season
has increased. This was followed by a presentation on likely rainfall by the Director
General of Irrigation Department. The third presentation by the Secretary to the WMP
described the SOP prepared for the forthcoming cultivation (Maha 2006/07) season based
on the output from the computer. This was followed by submissions from the
representatives of each system. Since there was adequate water available, no changes
were made to the water allocations or extent to be cultivated. However, farmers were able
to persuade the Pre-Seasonal WMP to either advance the date of water releases for
cultivation (since adequate water is available in the reservoir) or delay the water releases
(until maintenance work is over in canal system). Common issues related to farming
community, such as procuring input and marketing of products, were also discussed since
relevant government officials were present at the meeting.
Once allocations are made to different system at the national level, Officials along with
the BLFF allocate bulk water requirements to each DCFO. BLFF are requested to adjust
cultivation plan if there is a shortage of water.
Real time water transfer management
Due to uncertainties associated with hydrological forecasting on which the operation plan
is based and the complex nature of the distribution system, there will be deviations from
the SOP while implementing water distribution. Hence the operation plan has to be
continuously reviewed and revised to suit the actual conditions.
WMS has reasonably good feed back arrangements as they have weekly meetings with
the officers of CEB, Irrigation Department, Water supply and drainage board and MASL.
RPM of Mahaweli systems send details of water issues weekly on daily basis to WMS
while Irrigation Engineers provide those details on monthly basis to WMS. Details of
power generation, both hydro and thermal, are also obtained from CEB on weekly
intervals. WMS prepares a detail monthly report within first two weeks of the following
month. In these monitoring meetings any disputes that arise due to different interests in
competing water users ate discussed in detail to arrive at solutions acceptable to all
parties concerned. If the deviations from the SOP were found to be very significant
during implementation, it would be updated with actual system status at that time. WMS
has developed operating rules for reservoirs or “rule curves” to maximize the total
benefits. In planning weekly operations the rule curves are used as a guide though they
can not be strictly adhered to. Rule curves divide the reservoir in to zones in which
different operating policies apply.
Table 2. Institutional affiliation of participants at the Pre-Seasonal Water Management
Panel Meeting held on 5th October 2006 to decide water allocation for 2006/2007 maha
season
(This table is prepared from the minutes of the meeting downloaded from
www.mahaweli.gov.lk/Divisions/WMS/Weekly%20operational%20Meeting.pdf)
Title/position Number Institutional Affiliation
Additional Secretary 01
Media Advisor 01 Ministry of Mahaweli,
Agriculture & Irrigation
Secretary 01 Ministry of Agriculture
Director General 01
Executive Director 02
Director 03
Act. Director/Agriculture 01
Director (WM) 01
Director (WMS) 01
Computer Manager (WMS) 01
Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka
(MASL), Head Office in
Colombo
Director (Headworks O&M) 01
Director (Env. & Forestry) 01
Engineer (Mech & Eng) 03
Headwork Office, MASL, Digana
and Kotmale
Residential Project Manager (RPM) 19
Deputy Residential Project Managers
(DRPM) 04
Deputy Director 01
Marketing Director 01
Asst. Engineer 01
Civil Engineer 04
Mahaweli Systems H, G, G, B,
Huruluwewa, Medirigiriya etc)
Director General (Irrigation) 01
Directors 02
Chief Engineer 01
Irrigation Department (ID) Head
Office in Colombo
Director 01
Human Resource Officer 01 Irrigation Management Division
(IMD)
Zonal Directors/Irrigation 04
Provincial Irrigation Engineer 11 Provincial Departments of
Irrigation (PID)
Addl. Director (Nat. Resources) 01
Deputy Director (Seeds and Plant) 01 Department of Agriculture (DOA)
Chief Engineer 01
Electrical Engineer 01 Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB)
Chief supply Officer 01 National Water Supply and
Drainage Board (NWSDB)
Government Agent 03
Divisional Secretary 09
Land Officer 01
Government administrative
machinery at District level
Chairman of Farmer Organization 16
Secretary of Farmer Organization 07
Treasurer of Farmer Organization 01
Farmer Origination
representatives from Different
Mahaweli Systems
Total 111
Conflicts
Though, the preceding sections describe the inclusiveness of all the stakeholders in, a)
determining the water requirement, b) take part in decision making (at least legitimizing
the decisions taken), and c) get involved in operationalizing the decisions taken, conflicts
do arise. The following sections describe the various conflicts and possible conflict
resolutions mechanisms adopted.
a) Conflicts at national level
There are problems due to operational reasons between power generation and irrigation.
For example, release of water due to hydropower generation requirement during off
season when the canals and structures under maintenance leads to problems between
organizations. In some instances, water releases are too much for irrigation when
hydropower is generated at full capacity.
There are issues related to the restriction of system designs. Limitation on capacities of
Bowatenna Tunnel and Kandalama-Huruluwewa canal are constraints in diverting water
to system H and MH. In addition, large scale illegal water abstraction along the
Kandalama-Huruluwewa canal is a major problem faced by the farmers in Huruluwewa
system.
At present number of irrigation reservoirs supply domestic requirements of towns and
villages at the expense of irrigation, which at the moment is not large. But in future
demand for domestic water supply would grow rapidly and conflicts may occur as there
is no proper policy at present.
The WMP still provide a platform to bring these issues for discussions and decisions are
made, though such decision may not be satisfactory to all the parties concerned.
b) Conflicts at system level
Non adherence to the approved SOP by the farmers by cultivating more extents,
especially during Yala season, delayed cultivation and over use of water are the common
problems. However, these problems are being taken care of at system level through the
intervention of farmer organizations since numbers of such farmers are minimal.
The most common conflicts in Mahaweli systems occur specially during the unexpected
drought years when what is delivered at the system level is less than the allocated amount.
There are different coping mechanisms adopted by the local population. Bethma system
has been practiced from ancient times when there is a water shortage where only a
portion of the irrigable extent is cultivated (Goonasekere and Gamage, 1999). Change of
cropping pattern from high water demanding crops to less water demanding crop is a
another method. Extending irrigation interval in agreement with fellow farmers and
Mahaweli officials is also very common.
During very difficult situations, farmers seek solace in religious activities since the entire
community is affected. The religious leader in the village organizes chanting of “pirith”
or practice “fasting” expecting rain to come. In most instances, rain do come after some
time, perhaps, as a natural phenomenon, but the collective action of the community helps
them to go through this difficult period together. Rather than encouraging conflicts due to
limited resources, sharing the burden together is a common practice that is prevalent in
rural Sri Lanka.
c) Conflicts at the local level
From the preceding sections it was apparent that conflicts, both at national and system
level could be contained due to the strong intuitional arrangements at both levels.
However, there may be additional conflicts in between at the local administrative level
when water has to be diverted within the administrative boundaries at the district level.
The District Coordinating Committee (DCC) is the main administrative mechanism that
coordinates activities at the provincial/district level, which consist of all local members of
Parliament, Provincial Council, Pradeshiya Sabhas, Municipal councils and urban
councils in the district and all administrative officers, Heads of Departments of Provincial
Councils and regional/district officers representing line agencies (Officials from ID,
MASL, NWSDB included). It is chaired by the senior Member of Parliment or the
Cabinet Minister or Deputy Minister representing the district, and is co-chaired by the
Chief Minister of the Provincial Council. The District Secretary (Government
Administrative Officer) serves as the Secretary to the DCC. Though District Secretaries
participate for the national level WMP meetings and Pre-seasonal WMP meetings,
conflicts can occur when water is diverted between reservoirs and water issues are being
made at the reservoirs to the system. There is a tendency to get political interference in
such situations. However, this political interference has been not been able to
significantly disrupt the water management activities in the MGDP. The strong
institutional setup at national level and farmer organizations at system level, perhaps, lead
to the inability of the politicians to constantly interfere with the change of these
allocations at local level. In addition, politicians keep on changing during elections at
regular intervals. Some also may do not want to get involved in these difficult issues of
water management and hand over the responsibilities to bureaucrats to resolve the issues
as a convenience.
In order to strengthen this “loose” arrangements at the local level, a pilot project was
initiated under the World Bank funded ‘Mahaweli restructuring and rehabilitation
Project” to form a River Basin Committee of Kala Oya basin within which System H,
where bulk water allocation is introduced, is located. A former RPM was appointed as a
Basin Manager. The Kala Oya basin is 2870 sq.km and falls in four administrative
districts. Though the RBC was able to prepare a basin plan through consultations water
sub-sectoral line agencies, water users associations and NGOs, it was not implemented
due to lack of coordination between implementing agencies (Bandara, 2006). Reluctance
of local administrative authorities to share power in order to strengthen a new institution
at the river basin level was quoted as one of the reasons for failure. This also highlight the
fact that prescriptive institutions, such as ‘River Basin Committees’ promoted globally
can not just introduced when there are organizational arrangements of similar nature
exists, for example DCC in the Mahaweli case. Strengthening of such organization with
an additional mandate is a much better options rather than introducing preconceived
institution.
Lessons learned
Though there were many perceptions about the MGDP, it has contributed significantly to
the development of Sri Lanka. The investment made on the project has already recovered
through the generation of hydropower. Lands in the catchments areas and along the flood
plain have been earmarked and protected through legislations and required institutional
support. Sri Lanka has become self sufficient in paddy in late 1990s. Mahaweli also came
to rescue during "Thuruwila” water conflict (Athukorala, 2006), where water was
diverted for domestic purpose from a traditional irrigation tank, by agreeing to release
more water to the said tank
However water quality has recently become a major issue threatening the sustainability of
the project. On one hand demand for water is steadily rising while deteriorating water
quality tends to aggravate the situation. Therefore, it is important to strengthen the
institutional arrangements further in order to get other relevant sectors, such as
environmental, industry and health to address these new issues of high water demand and
deteriorating water quality problems.
The lessons leaned from the MGDP programme during its two decades of operation is
given below.
1. The political will at the highest level coupled with strong legislation (Mahaweli
Authority Act is one of the strongest Acts which overrides many other legislations
in Sri Lanka) and resource allocation (Highest investment made in history of Sri
Lanka for a single project when it was implemented) has succeeded in
implantation of the MGDP. Setting up of WMP and operationalizing it, especially
at the earlier stages where president himself chaired the meeting has helped to
avoid conflicts between irrigation and hydropower sectors. This is very much
similar to the Tennessy valley Project where political will, strong legislation and
resource allocation were made to make it successful.
2. The inclusiveness of all these stakeholders in planning, allocation and
operationalzing the decision taken has avoided conflicts, which otherwise would
have been insurmountable. The robustness of this institutional mechanism and the
transparent process followed in water allocation and its acceptance among the
water users has basically prevented the entry of other extraneous factors, such as
political interventions at substantive level, into the decision making and
implementation process. The institutional arrangements for water allocation in
Mahaweli has been in operation during last two decades and survived during
various political regimes. Attempts have been made by donors (World Bank) to
strengthen this institutional arrangement further so that MASL will later transform
itself in to a River Basin Authority so that water in all the river basins in Sri
Lanka also will be managed as presently being done through the exiting
mechanism at the MASL through WMP.
3. There are different platforms to iron out problems before such issues lead in to
conflicts. WMP at the head office in MASL is available to resolve issues between
different organizations at national level. Pre-Seasonal WMP meeting at national
level provide forum to discuss and agree water allocation at system level.
4. Strong organizational arrangement linking national to system level has helped to
plan, implement and monitor water allocation and use. Political and dministrative
interference can be minimized once there is a time-tested accepted method for
water allocation and monitoring.
5. Strong farmer organizations at system level are mandatory to help to resolve
water management issues at the local level. Consistent intervention in farmer
training over three decades, supported by introducing various policies and
legislation at regular intervals, whenever such measures are required, resulted
stronger farmer organizations to manage the water at system level.
6. The culture and tradition associated with strong religious background of farming
community helps to go through difficult period together rather than engaging in
conflicts when water available is less than the allocated amount due to vagaries of
nature.
Creating ‘apex organization’ at national level to plan ‘water resources development and
management’ considering ‘river basin as a planning unit’ and introducing policy and
legislation to create an enabling environment through stake holder participation to avoid
conflicts are some of the recommendations promoted globally under “Integrated Water
Resources Management. In this respect, Sri Lanka has already made some headway
towards achieving that vision through the MGDP.
References
Abeygunawardena, M.H. and K.A.U.S.Imbulana, 2005. Inter/Intra basin water transfers
and management in Mahaweli systems. In Proceedings of consultation on river basin
management. Lanka Jalani, International Irrigation Management Institute, Colombo. 43-
58.
Athukorala, Kusum, 2006. Water transfer out of agriculture: Towards a win-win solution?
A case study of Thuriwila. In: Intergrated Water Resources Management (Ed: Peter P
Mollinga, Ayaja Dixita dn Kusum Athukorala), Sage Publications. 317-351.
Birch, A and P.Muthukude, 2000. Institutional Development and capacity building for
integrated water resources management, Water Resources Council and Secretariat,
Colombo, Sri Lanka. 89 p.
De Silva, K.M. 2500. A history of Sri Lanka. Penguin books. 378-392.
Leach, E.R. 1959. Hydraulic Society in Ceylon. Past and Present, No 15
Manchanayaka, Palitha and Madduma Bandara, C.M. 1999. Water Resources of Sri
Lanka. Natural Resources Series No 4. National Science Foundation, Sri Lanka. pp112.
Samarasinghe, S.A.P. and Sumanasekere, D.U. 2005. Community empowerment and
management experiences in the water sector. In: Proceedings of consultation on river
basin management. Lanka Jalani, International Irrigation Management Institute, Colombo.
31-42.
Uphoff, Norman and Wijerathna, C.M. 2000. Demonstrated benefit from social capital:
The productivity of farmer organization in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka. World Develop

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